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ABSTRACT 
The religious nature of “In God we trust” is clear from the text and its history.  The Baptist minister who first 
proposed a religious motto suggested “the recognition of the Almighty God in some form in our coins” would 
“relieve us from the ignominy of heathenism.”  Both a McCarthy-era expansion and proposed diminutions under 
Theodore Roosevelt and George W. Bush confirm the religious nature of the motto. 
Courts have sought a secular legislative purpose for “In God we trust,” suggesting it formalizes our medium of 
exchange, fosters patriotism, expresses confidence in the future, encourages recognition of what is worthy, and 
celebrates our religious heritage.  Such post hoc secular rationales are unsupported by the historical record. 
When first proposed, it was said the religious motto “would make a beautiful coin, to which no possible citizen 
could object.”  But America has become a strikingly diverse society on matters of religious belief.  Almost a third of 
our citizens profess non-Christian faiths or identify as atheists, agnostics, or nothing in particular.  The religious 
motto is disrespectful of them. 
To test the secular legislative purposes identified by the courts, the article concludes by proposing that “In God we 
trust” be replaced on some coins with mottos which truly reflect our diverse religious heritage. 
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I wish as well as every body else to be perfectly happy, but like every body else it 
must be in my own way. 
—Jane Austen, Sense and Sensibility1 
INTRODUCTION 
Many Americans would no doubt be surprised to learn that we have a 
national march, tree, and flower.2  Federal law proclaims The Stars and Stripes 
	
 1  JANE AUSTEN, SENSE AND SENSIBILITY 135 (Patricia Meyer Spacks ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2013) 
(1811). 
 2 36 U.S.C. §§ 301–05 (2012) (designating, respectively, our national anthem, motto, floral emblem, 
march, and tree). 
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Forever our national march,3 the oak our national tree,4 and the rose our “na-
tional floral emblem.”5  Apart from questions about the reasoning behind 
such designations,6 the statutory choices seem not terribly controversial.7  
Not so the statutory designation of “In God we trust” as our national motto.8  
For our national motto is both ubiquitous and increasingly divisive.  It is ubiq-
uitous because it has appeared on American coins since 1864,9 and since 1955 
has been required by statute to be emblazoned on every bill and coin.10  In 
Fiscal Year 2015 alone, the United States produced in excess of twenty-three 
billion circulating notes and coins, every one of which affirmed In God we trust.11  
It is increasingly divisive because, although its sentiment was once perhaps 
nearly uniformly held among our citizens, it is no longer.  A significant and 
growing number of Americans do not place their trust in God, or place their 
trust in a god, or gods, other than the Christian God of the national motto.   
The following discussion considers both the constitutionality and the wis-
dom of having In God we trust on our currency.  We trace the history of having 
	
 3 36 U.S.C. § 304 (2012) (providing that “[t]he composition by John Philip Sousa entitled ‘The Stars 
and Stripes Forever’ is the national march”).  The national march is not to be confused with the 
national anthem, which the same chapter designates as the Star-Spangled Banner.  36 U.S.C. § 301 
(2012). 
 4 36 U.S.C. § 305 (2012) (providing that “[t]he tree genus Quercus, commonly known as the oak 
tree, is the national tree”). 
 5 36 U.S.C. § 303 (2012) (providing that “[t]he flower commonly known as the rose is the national 
floral emblem”).   
 6 The designations leave some questions unanswered.  Is the Union really made more perfect by 
having a national tree?  Why do we have a national floral emblem and not a national bird, a na-
tional march but not a national polka?   
 7 Although Glenn Miller’s swing classic St. Louis Blues March would be a much better national march.  
See MsCatreona, Glenn Miller and the Army Air Corps Orchestra: “The St. Louis Blues March,” YOUTUBE 
(July 10, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dmbflslh-js. 
 8 36 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (providing that “‘In God we trust’ is the national motto”). 
 9 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE MINT, 1896 SEC’Y OF THE 
TREASURY ANN. REP. ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES app. at 260–61 (1897), https://fra-
ser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/treasar/AR_TREASURY_1896.pdf [hereinafter 1896 
REPORT] (explaining that “the first suggestion of the recognition of the Deity on the coins of the 
United States was contained in a letter” from a Pennsylvania minister to Secretary of the Treasury 
Salmon P . Chase in 1861, and the suggestion was put into effect in 1864 “with the motto ‘In God 
we trust’”); History of “In God We Trust,” U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treas-
ury.gov/about/education/pages/in-god-we-trust.aspx.  The text of the minister’s letter mentioned 
in these accounts is reproduced in Appendix A. 
 10 Act of July 11, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-140, 69 Stat. 290 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5114 
(2012)) (providing that “all United States currency shall bear the inscription ‘In God We Trust’”). 
 11 In Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2015, the United States Mint produced 16.2 billion circulating coins.  Matthew 
Rhett Jeppson, Principal Deputy Director’s Letter, 2015 U.S. MINT ANN. REP. 1, 1, https://www.us-
mint.gov/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2015AnnualReport.pdf.  In FY 2015, the Bu-
reau of Engraving and Printing produced over seven billion regular notes.  U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Monthly Production Reports, MONEY FACTOR, 
https://www.moneyfactory.gov/resources/productionannual.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2017) (re-
porting that 7,033,400,000 bills were printed in FY 2015). 
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the motto on our currency, then the constitutionality of the practice.  We then 
briefly review modern changes in the religious affiliations of Americans, and 
consider two reform options that would make the composition of our currency 
both constitutional and respectful of all our citizens.  One would chart a new 
direction for our currency that would implement the religious heritage ra-
tionale of the courts in a way that truly reflects the history and diversity of the 
nation on matters religious.  The other would eliminate the problem.  We 
close by discussing how having In God we trust on our currency is part of a 
broader question of how we should respond to our growing religious diversity. 
I.  “THIS WOULD RELIEVE US FROM THE IGNOMINY OF HEATHENISM”: 
THE HISTORY OF IN GOD WE TRUST ON OUR CURRENCY 
In this Part, we look at four episodes during which the placement of In God 
we trust on our currency was at issue: the original decision during the Rebellion 
to place the motto on some coins, the First Omission when the motto was 
removed from some coins during the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, 
the expansion of the motto on our currency during the McCarthy era, and 
the Second Omission when the motto was diminished on some coins and mis-
takenly omitted from others during the administration of George W. Bush. 
A.  Origins During the Rebellion 
During the first year of the Rebellion, shortly after the Union defeat at 
the Battle of Ball’s Bluff, a Baptist minister from Pennsylvania, Reverend 
Mark R. Watkinson, wrote Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase to suggest 
“the recognition of the Almighty God in some form in our coins.”12  He ex-
plained the rationale for his request: “You are probably a Christian.  What 
if our Republic were now shattered beyond reconstruction?  Would not the 
antiquaries of succeeding centuries rightly reason from our past that we were 
a heathen nation?”13  Having suggested a coin design with the motto “God, 
liberty, law,” Reverend Watkinson concluded: 
This would make a beautiful coin, to which no possible citizen could object.  
This would relieve us from the ignominy of heathenism.  This would place 
us openly under the Divine protection we have personally claimed.  From 
my heart I have felt our national shame in disowning God as not the least of 
our present national disasters.14 
Secretary Chase acted upon Reverend Watkinson’s suggestion regarding 
the recognition of God.  The Secretary wrote James Pollock, the Director of the 
	
 12 1896 REPORT, supra note 9, at 260. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 260–61. 
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Mint, affirming his belief that “[n]o nation can be strong except in the strength 
of God, or safe except in His defense,” and his conclusion that “[t]he trust of 
our people in God should be declared on our national coins.”15  He ordered the 
Director of the Mint to implement Reverend Watkinson’s suggestion: “You will 
cause a device to be prepared without unnecessary delay with a motto express-
ing in the fewest and tersest words possible this national recognition.”16 
Secretary Chase’s directive could not have gone to a more cooperative 
individual.  Prior to being named the director of the Philadelphia Mint, 
James Pollock served as a judge, a member of Congress, and Governor of 
Pennsylvania.  A religious man, he served for thirty-five years as the vice 
president of the American Sunday-School Union.17  He was described as “an 
exemplary Christian worker”; reference was made to “[h]is sterling integrity 
and Christian patriotism.”18  Of him it was said: “He was always eager to do 
the Lord’s business, with earnestness and dispatch . . . .”19  Pollock believed 
in a national Christianity, as described in a speech he delivered in 1855: 
Citizens of America: Have you ever stopped to think where you are, what 
you have been, and what is your destiny?  There is a national Christian-
ity, . . . an American conscience, a great American heart; that heart, that 
conscience must be touched, must be enlightened with the glorious truths of 
the Bible ere they can feel and realize and know the responsibilities they owe 
to their country . . . .20 
Pollock’s brand of national Christianity led him to membership in the Na-
tional Reform Association.21  During the Rebellion the National Reform As-
sociation brought together Christian citizens of a certain orientation, whose 
goal was to amend the Constitution to acknowledge God’s divine authority.  
Their proposed amendment would have changed the Preamble to read: 
We, the People of the United States [recognizing the being and attributes of Almighty 
God, the Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures, the law of God as paramount rule, and 
Jesus, the Messiah, the Savior and Lord of all], in order to form a more perfect 
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the general 
welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and to our posterity, 
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.22 
	
 15 Id. at 261.  Reproduced at Appendix B. 
 16 Id. 
 17 EDWIN WILBUR RICE, THE SUNDAY-SCHOOL MOVEMENT AND THE AMERICAN SUNDAY-
SCHOOL UNION 177 (1917). 
 18 Id. at 177–78. 
 19 Id. at 179. 
 20 Id. at 178. 
 21 Martin Gruberg, In God We Trust, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AMERICA 486, 
487 (David Schultz & John R. Vile eds., Routledge 2015) (2005). 
 22 Gary DeMar, The National Reform Association, AM. VISION (Sept. 16, 2009) (alteration in original), 
https://americanvision.org/3026/the-national-reform-association/ (bracketing and italicizing 
proposed additions). 
	
250 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:2 
The Association intended that its constitutional amendment set a uniform 
national religion.  One proponent made the analogy that as “Constitutional 
laws punish for false money, weights and measures, and of course Congress 
establishes a standard for money, weights and measures, so Congress must 
establish a standard of religion.”23  The constitutional amendment proposed 
by the Association was intended to exclude non-believers, with one advocate 
asserting that “the existence of a Christian Constitution would disfranchise 
every logically consistent infidel.”24 
Having received the Secretary’s instructions as to the recognition of God 
on the nation’s coins, Director Pollock “carried out [Chase’s] directive with-
out delay”25: 
[H]e arranged for the striking of pattern half dollars and eagles ($10 gold 
pieces) bearing that date. . . . The pattern half dollars were identical in de-
sign to the Liberty Seated halves then being issued for commerce—except 
for the addition of the motto “God Our Trust” above the eagle on the re-
verse. . . . The pattern $10 coins . . . had the same Liberty Head design as 
regular $10 gold pieces of that time, but the words “God Our Trust” ap-
peared in the field above the eagle on the reverse.26 
The process continued: “In December, 1863, the Director of the Mint sub-
mitted to the Secretary of the Treasury for approval designs for new 1, 2, and 
3 cent pieces, on which it was proposed that one of the following mottoes 
should appear: ‘Our country; our God;’ ‘God, our Trust.’”27 
Secretary Chase responded by letter to Director Pollock on December 9, 
1863, approving the suggested language with changes: “I approve your mot-
toes, only suggesting that on that with the Washington obverse the motto should 
begin with the word ‘Our,’ so as to read: ‘Our God and our country.’  And on 
that with the shield, it should be changed so as to read: ‘In God we trust.’”28 
	
 23 LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 241 (rev. ed., 1967) (1953).   
 24 Id.  As Pfeffer chronicles it: 
The historian of the National Reform Movement suggested that if the Christian amend-
ment were adopted, those who “do not see fit to fall in with the majority . . . must abide 
the consequences, or seek some more congenial clime.”  But another man of God was 
somewhat less subtle in indicating the shortest way with dissenters.  If, he said, “the oppo-
nents of the Bible do not like our government and its Christian features, let them go to 
some wild, desolate land, and in the name of the devil, and for the sake of the devil, subdue 
it, and set up a government of their own on infidel and atheistic ideas; and if they can stand 
it, stay there till they die.” 
  Id. at 241–42. 
 25 Mike Fuljenz, “In God We Trust”—The Story of Our National Motto, SETINVESTIGATES.COM (Dec. 31, 
2012, 12:00 AM) http://setinvestigates.com/in-god-we-trust-the-story-of-our-national-motto-
p338-111.htm. 
 26 Id. 
 27 1896 REPORT, supra note 9, at 261. 
 28 Id.  
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The necessary legislation passed Congress on April 22, 1864, and the 2-
cent bronze coin became the first upon which In God we trust appeared.29  The 
following year Congress passed an authorization for the Director of the Mint, 
with the approval of the Treasury Secretary, to put the motto on any gold 
and silver coins of the United States where it would fit.30  The permission was 
repeated in the coinage act of February 12, 1873.31   
The motto In God we trust was first placed on coins during the Rebellion 
to provide evidence of the Christian, God-fearing qualities of the American 
people.32  Once the nation was relieved from the ignominy of heathenism by 
the placement of In God we trust on some American coins, the matter rested 
for four decades until the First Omission, during the administration of The-
odore Roosevelt, to which we now turn. 
B.  Theodore Roosevelt and the First Omission 
President Theodore Roosevelt became embroiled in controversy over In 
God we trust because he wanted a dramatic redesign of our coinage.33  In early 
1905, he arranged for sculptor Augustus Saint-Gaudens to design new $10 
and $20 gold coins.34  The President was involved in the design of the coins, 
and directed that In God we trust not be included in the design,35 a request with 
which Saint-Gaudens complied.36  
When Saint-Gaudens’ work was made public, the absence of In God we 
trust caused a public outcry.37  For example, after a protracted and tumultu-
ous debate, one mainstream religious denomination took a decisive stand: 
	
 29 Id.  
 30 Id.  
 31 Id.; see also CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. 672 (1873). 
 32 This was confirmed in a 1908 speech by Congressman Charles C. Carlin of Virginia to the House: 
I believe that the world already understands that we are a Christian, God-fearing, God-
loving people, and it was not necessary to emphasize this fact by the statute which origi-
nally allowed this motto to be placed upon our coins.  But it was done at a time when civil 
war was upon us; when the hand of brother was turned against brother; when the minds 
of men were enraged, and the settlement of problems was submitted to the arbitrament of 
arms, the result of which no man could at that time foretell. . . .  
It was at this time, viz., November, 1861, that a Pennsylvania minister advised the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, Mr. Salmon P. Chase, “that this nation might perish and that there 
should be some evidence of the religious faith of its inhabitants preserved upon its coins.”  
   42 CONG. REC. 3384 (1908) (statement of Rep. Carlin). 
 33  Q. David Bowers, Notes on the 1907 Saint-Gaudens $10 with Periods, Wire Rim, USPATTERNS.COM (Apr. 
13, 2001), http://uspatterns.com/j1774p19951.html. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Roosevelt Dropped ‘In God We Trust’: President Says Such a Motto on Coin Is Irreverence, Close to Sacrilege, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1907, at 1, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9406E2D81 
03EE033A25757C1A9679D946697D6CF.  Reproduced in Appendix C. 
 36 Bowers, supra note 33. 
 37 Roosevelt Dropped ‘In God We Trust,’ supra note 35 (“[N]umerous protests . . . have been received at 
the White House against the new gold coin which have [sic] been coined without the words ‘In 
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After a red-hot debate the Episcopal Diocesan Convention . . . yesterday, by 
a vote of 131 to 81, passed resolutions protesting against the elimination of 
the motto, “In God We Trust,” from the new ten-dollar gold pieces.  The 
debate on the question lasted an hour and a half, and for a part of that time 
the convention was in some disorder.38   
The Episcopalians protested against the omission and declared “that the 
highest interest of our country demands the preservation of all those customs 
that have stood for the recognition of God in the life of the people.”39 
President Roosevelt issued a letter outlining his position.40  He noted that 
there was no legal requirement that In God we trust be on coins, that he “did 
not approve of it,” and that he “did not direct that it should again be put 
on.”41  President Roosevelt’s position was not based on a disagreement with 
the sentiment or from feeling that the motto was inappropriate for govern-
ment display, far from it:   
It is a motto which is, indeed, well to have inscribed on our great National 
monuments, in our temples of justice, in our legislative halls, and in buildings 
such as those at West Point and Annapolis—in short, wherever it will tend 
to arouse and inspire a lofty emotion in those who look thereon.42 
The President described the motto as “[a] beautiful and solemn sen-
tence . . . [that] should be treated and uttered only with that fine reverence 
which necessarily implies a certain exaltation of spirit.”43  The use of the 
motto on coins, Roosevelt declared, bordered on sacrilege: “My own feeling 
in the matter is due to my very firm conviction that to put such a motto on 
coins, or to use it in any kindred manner, not only does no good, but does 
	
God We Trust’ . . . .”).  Controversy over Saint-Gaudens’ designs was not limited to the omission 
of In God we trust.  The $10 design was criticized when it was alleged that the model for the female 
figure on the obverse, Mary Cunningham, was not American-born.  The Order of Independent 
Americans, “admitting her rare beauty, object[ed] because she was born in Ireland.”  Bowers, supra 
note 33.  Another rumor asserted that the model was “said to have been taken from the portrait of 
his mistress, Davida Clark, with whom he is alleged to have had a child (although biographers have 
never been able to confirm this).”  Id.   
 38 Denounce Coin Motto Order: Episcopal Convention Votes, 131 to 81, to Retain “In God We Trust,” N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 14, 1907, at 1, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9406E2D8103EE03-
3A25757C1A9679D946697D6CF.  It does not appear that opposition within the convention to the 
resolution of condemnation was based on any question about the propriety of linking the federal 
government and Christianity.  One opponent, Dr. Gustav Carstensen, opposed the resolution be-
cause it gave a misleading inference about the religious faith of the nation: “I think this effort is a 
mistake and misleading in the inference that we go as a nation back into apostasy.  Our godliness 
is not shown in this . . . .”  Id.  Another opponent, Dr. Loring W. Batten, opposed the resolution, 
and the inclusion of the motto on currency, on Biblical grounds: “Dr. Batten admitted that the 
spirit of the resolution was good. . . . ‘It looks to me . . . as if this motto were upon the coins against 
the express command: “You cannot worship God and Mammon.”’”  Id. 
 39 Id.  
 40 Roosevelt Dropped “In God We Trust”, supra note 35. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
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positive harm, and is in effect irreverence, which comes dangerously close to 
sacrilege.”44  President Roosevelt was worried that the use of In God we trust 
on coins would be akin to its use in advertisements, and would debase it: 
Any use which tends to cheapen it, and, above all, any use which tends to 
secure its being treated in a spirit of levity, is from every standpoint pro-
foundly to be regretted. . . . But it seems to me eminently unwise to cheapen 
such a motto by use on coins, just as it would be to cheapen it by use on 
postage stamps or in advertisements.45   
Indeed, he cited his own experiences:  
I have never heard any human being speak reverently of this motto on the 
coins or show any signs of its having appealed to any high emotion in him, 
but I have literally, hundreds of times, heard it used as an occasion of and 
incitement to the sneering ridicule which it is, above all things, undesirable 
that so beautiful and exalted a phrase should excite.46 
The President allowed that the question was “absolutely in the hands of 
Congress,” and promised that “any direction of Congress in the matter will 
be immediately obeyed.”47  But, he concluded his letter, “I very earnestly 
trust that the religious sentiment of the country, the spirit of reverence in the 
country, will prevent any such action being taken.”48 
Clearly, Congress did not share the President’s analysis that the inclusion of 
In God we trust on coins was sacrilegious.  On January 7, 1908, the matter was 
addressed in the House.  Congressman Morris Sheppard of Texas spoke of the 
motto In God we trust in religious terms, characterizing it as “this striking sentence 
so expressive of American reverence and faith.”49  Asserting that “God is the 
source of liberty and religious freedom the basis of political independence,” he 
observed that the “American people are fundamentally a religious people,”50 
and then proceeded to describe a citizenry unified on matters religious: 
Perhaps every form of religious thought is represented among us and yet we 
are one in the recognition of a supreme and all-wise God.  The opportunity to 
worship the omnipotent Father according to the conscience of the individual 
is the basis of American history, the corner-stone of the American Common-
wealth.  There is an essential relation between God and freedom.  Liberty as 
	
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id.  President Roosevelt cited examples of such jokes, the humor of which may escape modern 
audiences, unaccustomed as we are to free-silver humor:  
For example, throughout the long contest extending over several decades on the free coin-
age question, the existence of this motto on the coins was a constant source of jest and ridi-
cule, and this was unavoidable.  Every one must remember the innumerable cartoons and 
articles based on phrases like “In God we trust for the 8 cents,” “In God we trust for the 
short weight,” “In God we trust for the 37 cents we do not pay,” and so forth and so forth.   
  Id.   
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 42 CONG. REC. 511 (1908) (statement of Rep. Sheppard). 
 50 Id. 
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a permanent prerogative of the people was for all practical purposes an impos-
sible conception before Abraham’s proclamation of the one all-seeing God.51 
He traced the role of God in the democratization of the world: 
[M]en who had worshipped kings and idols came soon to realize that the 
God of the spirit was the only rightful sovereign.  They came soon to under-
stand that with the same spiritual Father men were brothers both here and 
hereafter.  It followed immediately that men were spiritual and political 
equals, and liberty, equality, fraternity, dawned upon the human race.52 
Following this, he traced the hand of God in the founding and history of the 
United States: 
The beginnings of the United States were essentially religious, and a divine 
purpose may be seen in the events which made possible our country and its 
institutions.  Surely there was omnipotent design in the fact that the inven-
tion of printing, the discovery of America, and the European Reformation 
took place within the same century. . . . Thus under the especial favor of 
Providence America began. . . . [T]he finger of God may be traced in every 
crisis of American history and that the dominant note of American character 
has been an unfaltering trust in the wisdom and justice of Omnipotence.53 
Indeed, Congressman Sheppard concluded,  
[T]he hosts of earth’s exiled and earth’s wronged—flourished here under 
difficulties so tremendous, such pestilences, famines, massacres, and dissen-
sions, that their preservation and advancement can be attributed to no other 
source than the God whose worship they came to maintain in its original 
purity, whose freedom they were to transmit to posterity and eternity.54 
Following his protracted historical exegesis, Congressman Sheppard 
turned to whether the motto In God we trust should be returned to the nation’s 
currency.  He cast his argument in religious terms: 
It is particularly appropriate that the inscription “In God we trust” should 
appear upon our national moneys.  The coinage of a country is the most con-
crete and universal evidence of its sovereignty.  Is it not fitting that this most 
elemental expression of government should contain a recognition of the 
power to which the Government owes its foundation, its growth, its 
glory . . . ?  I believe . . . that the beautiful and stately sentence “In God we 
trust,” so symbolic of American history, American aspiration, American faith, 
should be permanently inscribed upon the coinage of the United States.55 
To bolster his case, Congressman Sheppard appended in the record a 
selection of editorials and letters from the Christian Herald.  The editorial po-
sition of the paper was that it was sacrilegious to remove the motto, an impi-
ous falsification of history to remove the recognition due God.56  The letters 
	
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 512 (preceding a note of “[Applause.]” in the record). 
 54 Id. (preceding a note of “[Applause.]” in the record). 
 55 Id. at 513 (preceding a note of “[Applause.]” in the record). 
 56 Editorial, Let Congress Restore It, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1116 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 
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reproduced at Congressman Sheppard’s behest were also religious in tone, 
including declarations that America was a Christian nation, such as the one 
that asked what the motto would mean to future generations: “Congress 
should restore the motto on our national coins as the motto of all our basic 
laws.  Historians of future centuries would then know beyond doubt that 
those coins represented a Christian nation which trusted in God, notwith-
standing the skeptic’s opinion.”57 
Another range of letters cast the inclusion of the motto on coins as a 
means of praising God for blessing this, his beloved country, such as the one 
that stated that God wanted the recognition: “The motto is an expression of 
honor, gratitude, and love from the American nation to the God who made 
them free.  The God of love wants public expression from His people that 
the world may see and profit by it, and He honors any opportunity taken to 
acknowledge Him.”58 
	
513 app. A. at 513 (1908) (“[A] great wrong has been committed in sacrilegiously removing the 
words which imply national recognition of God’s protecting care over our land and people and that 
dishonor has been done to the memories of those noble men who, in a time of severe national stress 
and trial, place the motto on our coinage. . . . Let us see to it that we do not falsify history by impi-
ously effacing from our coinage the recognition due to Him to whom we owe all our national great-
ness, happiness, and prosperity.”). 
 57 F. S. Cushion, Letter to the Editor, Congress Should Restore It, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), 
as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908); see also B. L. Turner, Letter to the Editor, 
Cling to the Motto, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 
514 (1908) (“If we, as a Christian nation, allow the removal of our motto, “In God we trust,” from 
our coins on account of ridicule and irreverence, we disown God . . . . Can our nation afford to do 
this?”); E. B. Stark, Letter to the Editor, We Need God’s Help Always, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 
(1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908) (“We are a Christian nation, but 
there is much to alarm us. . . . There is so much lawlessness and ungodliness that we need all the 
help and the recognition of our God to sustain us in our perils.”); G. W. Walker, Letter to the 
Editor, Let Congress Restore It, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 
app. A. at 514 (1908) (“Am now nearing the four-score mark, but hope and pray, ere God calls me 
home, to see this motto replaced on our coins, thus acknowledging God who has kept us and man-
ifesting to the world that we are a Christian people.”); Chauncey N. Pond, Letter to the Editor, 
Should Be Instantly Replaced, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1125 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 
app. A. at 515 (1908) (“While absolutely nonsectarian, it expresses the deep, unwavering faith of 
the vast mass of our people.  Its removal shocks the moral sense of the nation, and nothing less than 
its prompt and full restoration will satisfy the conscience of this Christian land.”); E. Francis, Letter 
to the Editor, Don’t Haul Down the Banner, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1125 (1907), as reprinted in 42 
CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 515 (1908) (“The removal of the motto shows an evidence of weakness 
and a catering to the adversary on the part of the authorities in power.  So long as we claim to be 
a Christian nation, Christian mottoes should dominate its citizens.  When a professedly Christian 
nation obliterates its Christian motto it permits or licenses the banner of truth to be hauled down 
and trampled under the feet of men.” ); W. C. Oliver, Letter to the Editor, A Blow at Christian Senti-
ment, CHRISTIAN HERALD 1125 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 515 (1908) 
(“The motto has adorned our coin for many years; and if left off now, the effect will certainly not 
aid or increase Christian sentiment, but rather the reverse.  We should trust God in all things.  Why, 
then, is the motto out of place on our coins when we claim to be a Christian nation?”).  
 58 Ada F. Button, Letter to the Editor, Let the Motto Stand, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted 
in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908) ; see also Elbridge G. Stout, Letter to the Editor, This Is 
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Another group asserted that the motto represented the religious faith of 
the nation, such as the one that characterized the motto as “a sermon in it-
self”: “We should keep the sacred motto, ‘In God we trust,’ on all our national 
coinage, because it is a sermon in itself and shows to the world that we as a 
nation believe in one God and recognize Him in our very commercial life.”59 
Others asserted that removing the motto from coins constituted blasphemy 
or a lack of reverence, such as the one that asked how to characterize the Pres-
ident’s action: “The Government of the United States has for many years pro-
claimed to the world that ‘In God we trust,’ but now she backs down; takes it 
all back.  We trust in God no longer.  If that is not blasphemy, what is it?”60 
A number of the letters cast the question over the inclusion of the motto 
on coins as a battle between the forces of God and God’s opponents, such as 
the letter exhorting the faithful: “Let us nail our colors to the masthead and 
go on to either defeat or victory, with our banners flying and with our trust 
in the living God emblazoned upon our coinage!”61 
	
“God’s Country,” 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 513 
(1908) (“As this is God’s beloved country, the words should certainly be retained along with the Amer-
ican eagle.”); S. A. D. H., Letter to the Editor, God the Nation’s Strength, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 
(1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 513  (1908) (“Who but God has been our strength 
and stay and made us the nation we are to-day?  Praise and honor to His holy name.”). 
 59 J. M. Stoner, Letter to the Editor, A Dangerous Step, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted 
in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908); see also Minna O. Brand, Letter to the Editor, The 
Nation Should Trust in God, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 
app. A. at 513 (1908) (“It inspired us to know that we, as a nation, trusted in God, and were not 
ashamed to admit it.  May we continue to trust in God as a little child would trust its mother.”); 
Charles B. Thompson, Letter to the Editor, It Expresses the Nation’s Faith, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 
1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908) (“A motto expressive of patri-
otism has no more right upon our coins than one expressive of the faith without which a nation 
would presently find itself in the dust.  Old Glory is not too good for everyday use; neither is the 
grand old motto, which has so long publicly expressed the highest faith of the great American peo-
ple.”); Julia Billings, Letter to the Editor, A Strong Protest Urged, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1125 (1907), 
as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 515 (1908) (“Let us hope that a strong protest on the 
part of our people may assure the continued imprint of a sentiment which acknowledges faith in 
the Almighty.”). 
 60 E. R. Reed, Letter to the Editor, Is It Blasphemy?, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1125 (1907), as reprinted 
in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 515 (1908); see also N. W. Merrill, Letter to the Editor, Like the 
Atheism of France in 1790, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 
app. A. at 513 (1908) (“No Christian . . . can possibly object to the stamping of that dear name and 
motto for which their fathers suffered so much.  I never dreamed that President Roosevelt would 
sanction such a want of reverence.”). 
 61 Elizabeth A. Reed, Letter to the Editor, Keep the Banner Flying, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1125 (1907), 
as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 515 (1908); see also W. T. Lone, Letter to the Editor, “God 
Forbid,” 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908) 
(“There are only two great leaders in the world, Christ and the devil. . . . Which of these desires the 
motto on our coins to remain, and which wants it erased?”); E. M. Sapp, Letter to the Editor, Will 
the Bible Be Dropped Next?, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. 
A. at 514 (1908) (“The dropping of the motto must have its root very near the borders of atheism; 
the next step may be the dropping of the Bible, as in the time of the French revolution.” ); Paul 
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Among the most memorable expressions reproduced from the Christian 
Herald by Congressman Sheppard were four works of poetry, more or less.  
One asked that God not be insulted and set aside by removing the motto 
from coinage,62 another asked if America was not still a Christian nation,63 
and the third characterized American currency with the motto as “God’s 
own coin.”64  Surely the best poem cited by Congressman Sheppard was both 
the shortest and the only one which was secular in tone: “Let all the people 
together join / And keep the motto on the coin.”65 
Congressman Henry S. Boutell of Illinois spoke briefly against restoration 
of the motto to the nation’s coinage.66  He began by conceding “that in every 
fit and appropriate way the American people should show to the world that we 
are a God-fearing people.”67  He merely felt, with President Roosevelt, that 
putting the motto on coins was not the appropriate way in which to profess our 
national religious views.  For authority, Congressman Boutell concluded by 
reading from the Bible, specifically from the twenty-second chapter of the Book 
of Matthew, concluding with the injunction to “[r]ender therefore unto Caesar 
the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s.”68 
On March 16, 1908, the matter came back before the House.  Repre-
sentative Charles C. Carlin of Virginia spoke on behalf of the subcommittee 
	
Grabill, Letter to Editor, They Stand for Our Highest Ideal, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1125 (1907), as 
reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908) (“If removed, what a lever it will put into the 
hands of the atheist!”). 
 62 See B. L. Turner, Letter to the Editor, Cling to the Motto, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as 
reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908) (“Cling to our motto, ‘In God we trust,’ / This 
for our nation surely is just. / God is our leader, He is our Guide, / Do not insult and set Him 
aside.”). 
 63 A. R. P., Letter to the Editor, Put Back the Motto, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 
42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908) (“Shall we not have the motto still, / These words, ‘In 
God we trust,’ / Upon our gold and silver coins? / Yes keep it there we must. / Our God has fought 
our battles well, / Kept us through good and ill; / Has given us peace and plenty, too; / Can we not 
trust Him still? / Are we a Christian nation yet, / And fear the truth to own? / ‘In God we trust,’ oh, 
let that fact / In every land be known. / Put back the motto on our coin, / And let us keep it 
there; / And as a nation by our deeds, / Its truthfulness declare.”). 
 64 Theodore Low, Letter to the Editor, Restore the Words, 30 , at 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. 
REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908) (“‘In God we trust.’  Most woeful day / When ceases thus our land 
to pray. / Restore the words you took away / From off our coins—brook no delay. / No matter what 
the scoffers say, / ‘In God we trust’—no better way. / Then lift us high, don’t drag us down, / And 
with the stars let’s wear the crown. / ‘In God we trust’—let’s pass it on / Each time we trade with 
God’s own coin. / Let’s raise the standard to the throne, / On coin, in life, the Lord to own.”).  
 65 John Owen, Letter to the Editor, How an Immigrant Views It, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), 
as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908). 
 66 42 CONG. REC. 516 (1908) (statement of Rep. Boutell). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. (quoting Matthew 22:21). 
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from which H.R. 17296 emerged.  He explained the rationale for the meas-
ure: “This action upon the part of the committee furnishes a lesson to the 
country and the world to the effect that this is a Christian nation . . . .”69   
Congressman Carlin sought to justify the expression of religious faith in 
the motto In God we trust by demonstrating that the United States was not the 
first nation to proclaim its religious faith through the use of a motto: “We can 
not claim any unique distinction for having pointed, by the use of a motto, 
to the faith of our fathers.  We were not the first nation to adopt a motto 
emphasizing its religious faith or belief . . . .”70 
He then placed the United States in the history of such national profes-
sions of religious faith or belief, starting with Constantine and Rome in A.D. 
312 and continuing with the Byzantine Empire, the Hebrews, the Arabs, 
England, Scotland, France, Portugal, Russia, Switzerland, Bavaria, Bruns-
wick, Luneburg, Prussia, Saxony, Austria, Hungary, India, Belgium, Naples, 
Sicily, Italy, Denmark, and Brazil.71  Looking at examples of nations which 
“represented upon [their] coins [their] faith in the Supreme Ruler of the 
Universe,” and coins as “a medium of giving expression to religious belief,” 
the Congressman turned his attention to “evidence of religious faith upon 
the coins in America,” and found pre-Revolutionary examples from the col-
onies of New Jersey, Carolina, New England, Louisiana, and Virginia.72  Be-
fore turning his attention to the placement of the motto on coins during the 
Rebellion, Congressman Carlin noted the example of Utah, which placed 
the inscription “Holiness to the Lord” on gold pieces it issued in 1849, as a 
reference “to the existence of an Omnipotent Being.”73 
Congressman Carlin began to conclude his plea for return of the motto 
with a statement regarding the underlying religious message of that inscription: 
In every Christian heart there beats the hope that you will by your action de-
termine that the circulating coin of this country shall carry the knowledge that 
we are a Christian people; that we believe that, however strong men grow, 
however powerful nations may become, there is a just, merciful, and eternal 
God, in whom the civilized world can faithfully and implicitly put its trust.74 
He concluded by linking the motto with Christian triumphalism:  
Mr. Chairman, we are a united people; civil war and strife are forever ban-
ished from our land; eternal peace on earth and good will toward men is the 
hope of every patriotic citizen.  This is and will be as long as we are firm and 
steadfast in the teachings of the God of Israel, and I entertain the hope and 
belief that before the world has seen another century, Christian thought and 
	
 69 Id. at 3384 (statement of Rep. Carlin). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 3384–85. 
 72 Id. at 3385. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
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Christian ideals will control the hearts and minds of all men and upon the 
wall of every home throughout the universe there will hang, for the enlight-
enment and encouragement of all who may follow, the sacred motto, “In 
God we trust.”75 
Congressman Carlin was followed by Congressman Ollie M. James of 
Kentucky, who announced that “the Christian legions of this nation will hail 
with delight favorable action upon this bill.”76  He tied the inscription of the 
motto on currency to missionary efforts abroad: 
This country is not only a Christian nation, but we are engaged in sending 
to foreign countries and to distant people our missionaries to preach the re-
ligions of Jesus Christ, and we want our money so that when this gold that 
you say is so good goes across the ocean and is held in the hands of those 
who do not know of the existence of the Saviour of the world, we can say: 
“Here are the dollars of the greatest nation on earth, one that does not put 
its trust in floating navies or in marching armies but places its trust in God.”77 
Congressman J. Hampton Moore of Pennsylvania cast the return of the 
motto to our coinage as a victory in the struggle between believers and non-
believers.  He started with a description of what followed from the removal 
of the motto and the introduction of the bills to restore it: 
Men have been emboldened to write in defiance of all religious sentiment.  
They have hailed the removal of the motto as a revolt against the wholesome 
teachings of the ages.  This we should not tolerate. . . . [W]hen such a chal-
lenge is put forth, a challenge that enters into every home and fireside, which 
confronts you and me as we go into our closet in secret to perform that one 
act of humility which makes worth in man, then I feel it is time to rise and 
declare, even by law, that this is a God-fearing nation, and that Congress 
can do no harm in making that declaration emphatic. . . . [W]hat harm can 
we possibly do by acknowledging to the world that God has a place in our 
institutions?  It can hurt none; it will console and comfort many.78  
Congressman Sheppard returned to the House floor to speak of the reli-
gious conflict bound up in the status of the motto: 
I desire merely to call attention to the fact that almost every infidel in the 
country has openly rejoiced over the removal of this motto.  Frequently Con-
gress has been flooded with circulars from infidel societies, protesting against 
the restoration of this legend. . . . The fact that the infidels openly object to 
their restoration, the fact that their removal would be used as an argument 
to destroy reverence rather than to inculcate it, ought to prompt Congress 
unanimously to restore the words, “In God we trust.”79   
	
 75 Id. (preceding a note of “[Loud applause.]” in the record). 
 76 Id. (statement of Rep. James). 
 77 Id. (preceding a note of “[Loud applause.]” in the record). 
 78 Id. at 3386 (statement of Rep. Moore) (preceding a note of “[Applause.]” in the record). 
 79 Id. at 3386–87 (statement of Rep. Sheppard) (preceding a note of “[Applause.]” in the record). 
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Congressman Charles G. Edwards of Georgia took up the theme of religious 
conflict, first allowing that he, unlike others, did not believe that President Roo-
sevelt was “an infidel.”80  He did, however, cast the conflict in terms of infidelity: 
That infidels all over the country openly rejoiced in the fact that the word 
“God” was stricken from our money is now a well-known fact.  Certain so-
cieties, known to be infidelic, have been protesting by mail to Congressmen 
and Senators against the restoration of this sentence.  The removal of this 
sentence from our coin did not depreciate its monetary value, but it depre-
ciated its sentimental value.  The removal of these words was a victory for 
infidelity.  The restoration of them to our coin will be a blow to infidelity and 
a victory for the God-fearing people of this great nation.81 
Notwithstanding the infidels who did not favor returning the motto to coins, 
Congressman Edwards was clear that the nation was unified behind his position: 
This is no sectarian question.  The Methodist, the Baptist, the Presbyterian, 
the Catholic, the Hebrews, the Episcopal, in fact all churches, all creeds, who 
have a belief in God, are as one in the opinion that it was a great mistake to 
ever have removed this motto from our coins, and they are one in the senti-
ment that this motto shall be restored.82 
He noted the history of the motto, arising from the national division of the 
Rebellion, but asserted that the nation was united in wanting the motto re-
turned as evidence of the religious convictions of the nation: 
[T]he sentiment was born when we were a divided people.  To-day, thank 
God! we are a reunited people forever.  We are but one people, with but one 
country and one God, with an underlying patriotism for our country and a 
steadfast faith in God.  The American people are glad to honor themselves 
and their country by having God’s name upon their coins.  “We are funda-
mentally a religious people.  We are distinguished by our devotion to reli-
gious and civil freedom.”  I dare say that every form of religious thought is 
represented in America, and yet we are one in the recognition of a supreme 
and all-wise God.83  
But, in the end, Congressman Edwards returned to the motto on coins as 
a symbol of religious victory over the infidels: “God has undoubtedly 
watched over us and directed us to national greatness, and I firmly believe 
that it is because we are a God-fearing nation.”84  He had already endorsed 
the quality of being God-fearing: 
I am not ashamed to proclaim my faith in God.  We need God-fearing men 
in all public positions.  A man who is not sound in his belief in God has no 
right in high office, which is the gift of a God-fearing people.  We represent 
God-fearing people, and we, their representatives, should be God-fearing 
representatives.85 
	
 80 Id. at 3387 (statement of Rep. Edwards) (“I do not charge, as some do, that the President is an 
infidel.”). 
 81 Id. (preceding a note of “[Applause.]” in the record). 
 82 Id. (preceding a note of “[Applause.]” in the record). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 3388. 
 85 Id. at 3387. 
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The Congressman concluded with an appeal for the motto, cast in terms of 
religious advocacy: 
If we would continue as the greatest of the nations of the world we must con-
tinue our faith in God.  The history of the nation that forgets God is sooner 
or later written in ruin.  Let us therefore fight infidelity until it is literally 
stamped out of our country.  Let us not retrograde, but rather let us go for-
ward.  Let us do nothing that smacks of national infidelity.  Let us not put an 
“infidel money” out upon the world, but let us put out the coin that says to 
all the world “Americans are a God-fearing and God-loving people.”86 
There were few voices raised in the House of Representatives against re-
storing the motto the nation’s coins.  Congressman Küstermann of Wisconsin 
opposed returning the motto to coinage: “I am against replacing the motto 
‘In God we trust’ on our coins, because I do not believe in any religion that in 
order to thrive needs advertising, nor do I believe in any person that always 
hangs out his shingle ‘I am a Christian.’”87  Congressman George W. Gordon 
of Tennessee characterized placing the motto on coins as “rather a show of 
conventional hypocrisy than of patriotic reverence,” which was “a medium of 
secular, and not sacred, transactions.”88  He asked, because people did not 
stop to consider “its sacred significance,” “[D]oes it not seem rather a device 
of hypocrisy and irreverence than of sincerity and veneration?”89 
The committee report in the House reflected a religious motivation for the 
action.  Asserting that “the measure simply reflects the reverent and religious 
conviction which underlies American citizenship,” the Committee adopted the 
subcommittee’s rationale for the restoration of the motto to the nation’s coins: 
Your subcommittee is unanimous in the belief that as a Christian nation we 
should restore this motto to the coinage of the United States upon which it 
was formerly inscribed “as an outward and visible form of the inward and 
spiritual grace,” which should possess and inspire American citizenship, and 
as an evidence to all the nations of the world that the best and only reliance 
for the perpetuation of the republican institution is upon a Christian patri-
otism, which, recognizing the universal fatherhood of God, appeals to the 
universal brotherhood of man as the source of the authority and power of all 
just government.90 
The measure passed the House of Representatives 259-5.91  As he had 
indicated he would, President Roosevelt signed a resolution “That the motto 
‘In God We Trust,’ heretofore inscribed on certain denominations of the gold 
and silver coins of the United States of America, shall hereafter be inscribed 
upon all such gold and silver coins of said denominations as heretofore.”92 
	
 86 Id. at 3389. 
 87 Id. at 3386 (statement of Rep. Küstermann). 
 88 Id. at 3389 (statement of Rep. Gordon). 
 89 Id. at 3390. 
 90 H.R. REP. NO. 60-1106, at 1–2 (1908). 
 91 42 CONG. REC. 3391(1908).  
 92 Act of May 18, 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-120, 35 Stat. 164 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5112(d)(1) (2012)). 
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Once the nation was saved from infidelity by the return of In God we trust 
to some American coins, the matter rested for almost five decades until the 
expansion of the practice during the McCarthy era, to which we now turn. 
C.  Expansion During the McCarthy Era 
Although after 1907, In God we trust appeared on virtually all American 
coins, it did not appear on American bills.  This was remedied during the 
McCarthy era, in July of 1955, when legislation was approved requiring the 
motto on all coins and currency of the United States.93 
Insight into the administrative and legislative purpose behind the decision 
to require In God we trust on currency can be gained from a related action 
taken the year before, the modification of the Pledge of Allegiance to include 
the words “under God.”94  The purpose of that action was hardly secular.  In 
his signing message, President Eisenhower started by noting that “From this 
day forward, the millions of our school children will daily proclaim in every 
city and town, every village and rural school house, the dedication of our 
nation and our people to the Almighty.”95  He concluded his statement by 
	
 93 Act of July 11, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-140, 69 Stat. 290.  This predated another McCarthy-era act, 
the adoption of In God we trust as our national motto, which happened a year later, in July of 1956.   
Act of July 30, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-851, 70 Stat. 732 (codified as amended at 36 U.S.C. § 302 
(2012)). 
 94 Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 249 (codified as amended at 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) 
(“I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it 
stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”).  The argument has 
been made that notwithstanding the inclusion of the words “under God,” recitation of the Pledge 
is a patriotic, not a religious, exercise.  In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist argued that the Pledge 
is a declaration of belief in allegiance and loyalty to the United States flag and the Republic 
that it represents.  The phrase “under God” is in no sense a prayer, nor an endorsement 
of any religion, but a simple recognition of the fact noted in H. R. Rep. No. 1693, at 2: 
“From the time of our earliest history our peoples and our institutions have reflected the 
traditional concept that our Nation was founded on a fundamental belief in God.”  Recit-
ing the Pledge, or listening to others recite it, is a patriotic exercise, not a religious one; 
participants promise fidelity to our flag and our Nation, not to any particular God, faith, 
or church. 
  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 31 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judg-
ment).  In one sense, of course, the argument is correct.  As originally framed, the Pledge of Alle-
giance was not a religious affirmation for the simple reason that as originally framed the Pledge did 
not include the language “under God.”  As originally framed in 1892 by socialist Francis Bellamy, 
the pledge read: “I pledge allegiance to my Flag and the Republic for which it stands, one nation, 
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”  The Pledge of Allegiance, USHISTORY.ORG, 
http://www.ushistory.org/documents/pledge.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).  In 1923 the text was 
changed to make it specific to the United States: “I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United 
States of America and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation, indivisible, with liberty and 
justice for all.”  Id. 
 95 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill to Include the 
Words “Under God” in the Pledge to the Flag (June 14, 1954), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1954, at 563 (1960). 
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asserting the “profound meaning” of the law: “In this way we are reaffirming 
the transcendence of religious faith in America’s heritage and future . . . .”96   
The next year, Congress took up the related question of requiring by stat-
ute that the motto In God we trust be placed on all currency of the nation.  The 
formal discussion started on April 13, 1955, when Congressman Bennett of 
Florida spoke in favor of H.R. 619, his bill “to provide that all United States 
currency shall bear the inscription ‘In God we trust.’”97  His stated rationale 
was a mix of Cold War politics and religion: 
In these days when imperialistic and materialistic communism seeks to attack 
and to destroy freedom, it is proper for us to seek continuously for ways to 
strengthen the foundations of our freedom.  At the base of our freedom is our 
faith in God and the desire of Americans to live by His will and by His guid-
ance.  As long as this country trusts in God, it will prevail.  To remind all of 
us of this self-evident truth, it is proper that our currency should carry these 
inspiring words, coming down to us through our history: “In God we trust.”98  
On June 7, 1955, the House took up and passed H.R. 619 unanimously, 
with little discussion.99  Besides repeating his comments from April, Congress-
man Bennett again made the religious link: “Nothing can be more certain than 
that our country was founded in a spiritual atmosphere and with a firm trust 
in God.  While the sentiment of trust in God is universal and timeless, these 
particular four words ‘In God We Trust’ are indigenous to our country.”100 
The Senate took up the resolution three weeks later, under the leadership 
of Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas.  He described as “an oversight” the 
fact that paper money had been issued for almost a century with “no inscrip-
tion . . . reflecting the spiritual basis of our way of life.”101  With no debate, 
the Senate passed the measure to “reaffirm a policy which has been in exist-
ence for over 75 years by way of expressing our trust in God.”102 
Once the nation had affirmed the spiritual basis of our way of life by hav-
ing In God we trust on all American currency, the matter rested for five dec-
ades, until the Second Omission, during the administration of George W. 
Bush, to which we now turn. 
	
 96 Id.  
 97 101 CONG. REC. 4384 (1955) (statement of Rep. Bennett). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 7796 (statement of Rep. Bennett). 
 100 Id.  
 101 Id. at 9448 (statement of Sen. Johnson). 
 102 Id. at 9449 (statement of Sen. Monroney).  The Senate floor discussion was diverted by two ancillary 
matters.  Senator Carlson from Kansas wanted to put In God we trust on postage stamps.  Id. at 9448 
(statement of Sen. Carlson).  Senator Case of South Dakota wanted to place an image of Mount 
Rushmore on the one-dollar bill.  Id. at 9448 (statement of Sen. Case).  
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D.  George W. Bush and the Second Omission  
A century after Theodore Roosevelt dealt with the disappearance of In 
God We Trust from our coinage, George W. Bush faced much the same prob-
lem.  His challenge arose in 2007 with the issue of the Presidential-series one-
dollar coin.103  Like the First Omission under President Roosevelt, the Sec-
ond Omission under President Bush was caused by an ambitious plan to 
make the national coinage more dramatic and modern.  
Like the situation a century earlier, the Second Omission started without 
any drama.  In December of 2005, Congress passed the statutory authoriza-
tion for a new series of one-dollar coins, honoring America’s presidents.104  
The bill was not controversial; it passed the Senate by unanimous consent 
and the House by a vote of 291-113.105  President Bush signed the bill into 
law days before Christmas, 2005.106 
The statute authorizing the presidential series of one-dollar coins pro-
vided for the design of both the obverse and the reverse.  The obverse was to 
have “the name and likeness of a President” and certain “basic information” 
about that President.107  In addition to the inscriptions “$1” and “United 
States of America,” the reverse was to have “a likeness of the Statue of Lib-
erty extending to the rim of the coin and large enough to provide a dramatic 
representation of Liberty while not being large enough to create the impres-
sion of a ‘2-headed’ coin.”108  The provision which ultimately proved so con-
troversial required In God we trust and E Pluribus Unum be done as “edge-in-
cused inscriptions.”109  Edge-incused inscriptions are those carved into the 
rim of the coin, on neither the obverse nor the reverse face.  The statute 
	
 103 In 1971, after a thirty-five-year hiatus in the production of one-dollar coins, the U.S. Mint started 
issuing the denomination again.  See Eisenhower Dollars, MY COIN GUIDES, http://eisenhowerdol-
larguide.com (last visited Dec. 31, 2017).  The Mint issued the Eisenhower dollar from 1971 to 
1978, the Susan B. Anthony dollar from 1979 to 1981 and again in 1999, the American Silver Eagle 
dollar starting in 1986, and the Sacagawea dollar starting in 2000.  All four designs (including the 
two modifications of the Sacagawea dollar) included “IN GOD WE TRUST” on the face.  See 
American Silver Eagle Coins, MY COIN GUIDES, http://silvereagleguide.com (last visited Dec. 31, 
2017); Eisenhower Dollars, supra; Sacagawea Dollars, MY COIN GUIDES, http://sacagaweadollar-
guide.com (last visited Dec. 31, 2017); Susan B. Anthony Dollars, MY COIN GUIDES, http://su-
sanbanthonydollar.org (last visited Dec. 31, 2017). 
 104 Presidential $1 Coin Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-145, 119 Stat. 2664, 2665 (2005) (codified at 31 
U.S.C. §§ 5101, 5112). 
 105 151 CONG. REC. S13421–24 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2005); 151 CONG. REC. H11447–50 (daily ed. 
Dec. 13, 2005). 
 106 Presidential $1 Coin Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-145, 119 Stat. 2664 (giving December 22d as 
the date of enactment). 
 107 31 U.S.C. § 5112(n)(2)(B). 
 108 Id. § 5112(n)(2)(A). 
 109 Presidential $1 Coin Act of 2005 § 102, 119 Stat. at 2666 (“The inscription of the year of minting 
or issuance of the coin and the inscriptions ‘E Pluribus Unum’ and ‘In God We Trust’ shall be edge-
incused into the coin.”). 
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passed by Congress and signed by President Bush specifically provided that 
In God We Trust be edge-incused on the new coin.  But the statute went fur-
ther; it was a paean to edge incusal.  In its findings, Congress declared: “Plac-
ing inscriptions on the edge of coins, known as edge-incusing, is a hallmark 
of modern coinage and is common in large-volume production of coinage 
elsewhere in the world . . . but it has not been done on a large scale in United 
States coinage in recent years.”110  Congress found that edge incusing the 
mottos and emblems would allow for aesthetic improvements in the coins: 
In order to revitalize the design of United States coinage and return circu-
lating coinage to its position as not only a necessary means of exchange in 
commerce, but also as an object of aesthetic beauty in its own right, it is 
appropriate to move many of the mottos and emblems, the inscription of the 
year, and the so-called ‘‘mint marks’’ that currently appear on the 2 faces of 
each circulating coin to the edge of the coin, which would allow larger and 
more dramatic artwork on the coins . . . .111  
And Congress made a reference to an earlier age that was ironic, given the 
controversy that was about to unfold: 
[This] would allow larger and more dramatic artwork on the coins reminis-
cent of the so-called ‘‘Golden Age of Coinage’’ in the United States, at the 
beginning of the Twentieth Century, initiated by President Theodore Roo-
sevelt, with the assistance of noted sculptors and medallic artists James Earle 
Fraser and Augustus Saint-Gaudens.112   
In the calm before the storm, after Congress passed the authorizing stat-
ute for the edge-incused Presidential dollars but before the public became 
aware of what had been done, President George W. Bush issued a proclama-
tion regarding the national motto that spoke to its religious character: 
 On the 50th anniversary of our national motto, “In God We Trust,” we 
reflect on these words that guide millions of Americans, recognize the bless-
ings of the Creator, and offer our thanks for His great gift of liberty. 
 From its earliest days, the United States has been a Nation of Faith. . . .  
 . . . . 
 As we commemorate the 50th anniversary of our national motto and 
remember with thanksgiving God’s mercies throughout our history, we rec-
ognize a divine plan that stands above all human plans and continue to seek 
His will.113 
Once the public became aware of it, the edge-incused motto on the new 
coin proved controversial.114  It was claimed that moving the motto to the 
	
 110 Id. § 101(11), 119 Stat. at 2665. 
 111 Id. § 101(10), 119 Stat. at 2665. 
 112 Id. 
 113 50th Anniversary of Our National Motto, ‘‘In God We Trust,’’ 2006, Proclamation No. 8038, 71 
Fed. Reg. 43,343 (July 27, 2006).  
 114 See Faith Under Fire: New U.S. Dollar Coins Hide “In God We Trust,” WORLDNETDAILY (Nov. 27, 2006, 
1:52 AM), http://www.wnd.com/2006/11/39043/. 
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coin edge would “trivialize the words,”115 and feared that moving the motto 
to the coin edge was a step on the path of removing it entirely.116  Moving In 
God we trust to the edge of the coin was seen as evidence of faith being under 
attack,117 part of an attempt to “phase God out of America.”118  The contro-
versy over the new Presidential dollars became even more intense when the 
Mint accidently produced and released a run of the new Presidential dollars 
without even the edge-incused In God we trust motto.119   
On June 28, 2007, the floor discussion turned to an amendment by Con-
gressman Roger Wicker of Mississippi to “restore to the face, or the obverse, 
of the dollar coin . . . that is being minted now, the words ‘In God We Trust’ 
and ‘E Pluribus Unum.’”120  Congressman Jose Serrano of New York spoke 
in opposition to the amendment, not on the substance of having the mottos 
on the coin, but because he believed the Wicker amendment would not ac-
complish the end the sponsor wanted.121 
On September 7, 2007, Congressman Dan Burton of Indiana spoke to 
the placement of the motto on coins, casting the question as part of a larger 
controversy over the role of religion and faith in society: 
There are a lot of people in this country who have tried to get all symbols of 
religion, belief in God taken off of all public properties and coins and cur-
rency.  Recently, there were thousands of coins minted without “In God We 
Trust” on them, and now they’re talking about putting “In God We Trust” 
in an obscure place on coins so that people can’t read it, right on the edge of 
the coin.  I think this is—we’re moving in a very, very wrong direction.122  
Congressman Burton traced the conflict to the origins of the nation: “This 
country was formed with a firm reliance on God Almighty, and when we 
start taking God out of everything, as some people want to do, we run the 
	
 115 “In God We Trust” Redesign for Dollar Coins, CATH. NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 8, 2008, 2:11 PM), 
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/in_god_we_trust_redesign_for_dollar_coins/ (“Crit-
ics had complained about the present placement of the motto, claiming its position on the outer 
edge of the coins would trivialize the words.”). 
 116 Id. (“Tony Perkins, the president of the Family Research Council, said . . . his group had been con-
cerned that ‘moving “In God We Trust” off the face of our coins was just one step toward removing 
it altogether.’”). 
 117 See Faith Under Fire: New U.S. Dollar Coins Hide “In God We Trust,” supra note 114. 
 118 In God We Trust Controversy on Dollar Coins Resolved, SLIDESHARE, http://www.slideshare.net/stereo-
typedeyew03/in-god-we-trust-controversy-on-dollar-coins-resolved (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) 
(“Shortly after the release of the Presidential Dollar series, there was public controversy about the 
apparent omission of the ‘In God We Trust’ motto.  Some widely circulated chain emails and arti-
cles stated that the motto had been removed as an attempt to ‘phase God out of America.’”). 
 119 153 CONG. REC. 17,956 (2007) (statement of Rep. Goode) (noting “numerous mint errors” based 
on “accounts that as many as 30,000 dollars do not have the etching on the side of In God We 
Trust or E Pluribus Unum.”). 
 120 Id. at 17,955 (statement of Rep. Wicker). 
 121 Id. at 17,956 (statement of Rep. Serrano) (“Your effect may be that you will go down in history as 
the gentleman who took In God We Trust off the coins and didn’t put in on anywhere else.”). 
 122 Id. at 23,969–70 (statement of Rep. Burton). 
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risk of having him turn his back on us.”123  He warned of the consequences 
of taking the motto off currency: 
 Those who try to take God off of all things governmental, such as coinage 
or currency . . . are making a terrible mistake, in my opinion. . . .  
 Once you start turning your back on the good Lord, I think you are going 
to reap the whirlwind, and this is something this Nation cannot afford to do 
right now.124 
A corrective provision was included in the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 2008.125  Heeding Congressman Burton’s warning, the nation avoided 
turning its back on the good Lord, and the motto In God we trust returned to 
the face of our coinage.  
II.  “FIRST, THE STATUTE MUST HAVE A SECULAR LEGISLATIVE  
PURPOSE . . .”: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HAVING  
IN GOD WE TRUST ON OUR CURRENCY 
Where the questions of religion are concerned people are guilty of every possible 
kind of insincerity and intellectual misdemeanor. 
—Sigmund Freud126 
Given the clear religious tone of the history surrounding the placement, 
retention, and expansion of In God we trust on our currency, it is not surprising 
that the authorizing and mandating statutes have been the subject of consti-
tutional challenges.  The constitutionality of having In God we trust on our 
currency has been considered five times: in 1970 by the Ninth Circuit in Ar-
onow v. United States,127 in 1979 by the Fifth Circuit in O’Hair v. Murray,128 in 
	
 123 Id. at 23,970. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 623(a)(2), 121 Stat. 1844, 2018 
(2007) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5112(n)(2)(F) (2012)) (“Inscription of ‘In God We Trust’.—The de-
sign on the obverse or the reverse shall bear the inscription ‘In God We Trust’.”). 
 126 SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION, 56–57 (Ernest Jones ed., W. D. Robson-Scott 
trans., Liveright Publ’g Corp. 1955) (1928). 
 127 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970).  The Aronow court found that the placement of In God we trust on cur-
rency had “nothing . . . to do with the establishment of religion,” that “[i]ts use is of a patriotic or 
ceremonial character and bears no true resemblance to a governmental sponsorship of a religious 
exercise,” and that the practice “is excluded from First Amendment significance because the motto 
has no theological or ritualistic impact,” but has only “inspirational quality.”  Id. at 243–44 (citing 
PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 238; then citing S. REP. NO. 84-637 (1955), as reprinted in 1955 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2417, 2417; and then quoting H. REP. NO. 84-1959 (1956), as reprinted in 1956 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3720, 3720–21).  The court noted that it also offers “spiritual and psychological value.”  
Id. at 244 (quoting H. REP. NO. 84-1959 (1956), as reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3720, 3720–21). 
 128 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).  The Fifth Circuit affirmed without analysis a Texas 
district court opinion rejecting challenges to the national motto and its placement on currency.  Id. 
at 1144.  The district court followed the Ninth Circuit’s findings in Aronow that the motto and its 
inclusion on currency “has nothing whatsoever to do with the establishment of religion,” and that 
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1996 by the Tenth Circuit in Gaylor v. United States,129 in 2010 by the D.C. 
Circuit in Kidd v. Obama,130 and in 2014 by the Second Circuit in Newdow v. 
Peterson.131  While none of the cases sustained the challenges to the placement 
of In God we trust on currency, their analyses were not uniform.  One case was 
decided before Lemon v. Kurtzman.132  The four cases decided after Lemon 
found, among them, five different secular legislative purposes for the place-
ment of In God we trust on currency. 
A.  Pre-Lemon: No Theological Impact 
Writing the year before Lemon, the Aronow court first suggested that the 
motto and its inclusion on currency “is of a patriotic or ceremonial charac-
ter,”133 but then conceded that the terms “‘ceremonial’ and ‘patriotic’ may not 
be particularly apt words to describe the category of the national motto.”134   
Having apparently abandoned the patriotic or ceremonial justification, 
the Aronow court shifted to the argument that In God we trust “is excluded from 
First Amendment significance because the motto has no theological or ritu-
alistic impact.”135  The court cited only one authority for this proposition, 
and that authority does not support the assertion.  The complete passage to 
which the Aronow court cited is:  
	
the motto was “‘excluded from First Amendment significance because the motto has no theological 
or ritualistic impact.’”  O’Hair v. Blumenthal, 462 F. Supp. 19, 19–20 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (quoting 
Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243). 
 129 74 F.3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996).  Gaylor addressed claims that the motto In God we trust and its 
inscription on currency violated the Establishment Clause.  Id.  The Gaylor court found “the statutes 
establishing the motto and requiring its reproduction on U.S. currency easily meet the requirements 
of the Lemon test.”  Id. at 216 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).  The Gaylor court 
also evaluated the motto and currency statutes under the endorsement test, and determined the 
motto and currency statutes “fulfill the requirements of the endorsement test.”  Id. at 217. 
 130 387 F. App’x 2 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  Kidd affirmed that the placement of In God We Trust on currency 
did not violate the First Amendment, quoting Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243, in a parenthetical for the 
proposition that “[i]t is quite obvious that the national motto and slogan on coinage and cur-
rency . . . has nothing whatsoever to do with the establishment of religion.” Id.  
 131 753 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014).  The Newdow plaintiffs challenged the statutory provisions that require 
the placement of the motto on the nation’s coins and currency based on the Establishment Clause, 
the Free Exercise Clause, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).  Id. at 106.  The 
Newdow court declined to find either an Establishment Clause deficiency or a Free Exercise Clause 
and RFRA defect in the motto In God We Trust and its placement on currency.  Id. at 108–10. 
 132 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  Aranow, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970), was decided the 
previous year.  
 133 Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243 (“[T]he national motto and the slogan on coinage and currency ‘In God 
We Trust’ . . . is of a patriotic or ceremonial character and bears no true resemblance to a govern-
mental sponsorship of a religious exercise.”).  The court cited no authority for this assertion. 
 134 Id.  The concession was repeated by the district court in O’Hair v. Blumenthal.  462 F. Supp. 19, 20 
(W.D. Tex. 1978) (quoting Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243). 
 135 Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243 (citing PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 238).  This rationale was repeated by the 
district court in O’Hair v. Blumenthal.  462 F. Supp. at 20 (quoting Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243). 
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Separation purists like Jefferson might have theoretic objections to these, but 
even he recognized that as a practical matter such ceremonial verbalizations 
could frequently not be avoided; both his Declaration of Independence and his 
Virginia Religious Freedom statute invoked God.  The problems raised by such 
references are not intrinsic but extrinsic; that is, of themselves they are of no 
practical significance, but their importance lies in their facile and frequent use 
to justify practices that raise substantial and practical church-state problems.136 
The cited passage does not address whether In God we trust has theological or 
ritualistic impact. 
Nor did the Aronow court gain any support from its uncritical reliance on 
the assertion that such religious references “could frequently not be 
avoided.”137  If the assertion was structural, that the various writings could 
not have been done without the references to God, it was obviously incor-
rect.138  If the assertion was political, that the various writings could not have 
been done without references to God because of pressure from the Christian 
majority to include them, it undermines, not supports, the assertion that the 
writings are constitutional.  
Beyond the fact that the only authority cited by the Aronow court for the 
proposition that the placement of In God we trust on currency “is excluded 
from First Amendment significance because the motto has no theological or 
ritualistic impact”139 doesn’t offer any support, the proposition is itself untrue.  
The motto has intrinsic religious content.  If nothing else, the slogan In God 
	
 136 Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243 n.2 (quoting PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 238). 
 137 Id. (quoting PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 238). 
 138 Pfeffer cites to the Declaration of Independence and the Virginia Religious Freedom statute.  
PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 238.   
The Declaration of Independence contains four references to God: “Nature’s God,” “their 
Creator,” “the Supreme Judge of the world,” and “divine Providence.”  THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2, 5 (U.S. 1776).  Each could have been written to be secular.  “[T]he 
separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them,” id. para. 1, 
could have been “the separate and equal station to which they are entitled.”  “We hold these truths 
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights,” id. para. 2, could have been, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all 
men are created equal, that they are endowed with certain unalienable Rights.”  “[A]ppealing to the 
Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions,” id. para. 5, could have been “ap-
pealing to the world for the rectitude of our intentions.”  “[W]ith a firm reliance on the protection of 
divine Providence,” id., could have been “with a firm reliance on our protection.” 
The Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom contains two references to God: “Al-
mighty God” and the “Lord.”  VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (2017) (“Act for religious freedom recited”).  
Both could have been written to be secular.  “Whereas, Almighty God hath created the mind free,” 
id., could have been “the mind hath been created free.”  “[A]nd therefore are a departure from the 
plan of the holy author of our religion, who being Lord, both of body and mind yet chose not to 
propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do,” id., could have been “and 
therefore are a departure from the proper role of religion, which ought not be propagated by coer-
cions on either body or mind.” 
 139 Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243 (citing PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 238).  This rationale was repeated by the 
district court in O’Hair v. Blumenthal.  462 F. Supp. at 20 (quoting Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243). 
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we trust asserts that God exists, a question not historically considered devoid 
of theological content.  The existence of God was addressed by Aristotle in 
his Metaphysics,140 and Plato in the Laws.141  It had enough theological weight 
to be one of the first parts of St. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica.142  Some 
assert the existence of a single God.143  Feuerbach wrote of God and human-
ity.144  In the 1830s Abner Kneeland declared his non-belief and was jailed 
by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for blasphemy;145 sixty years later 
Robert Ingersoll declared his non-belief and was a celebrated author: “Is 
there a supernatural power—an arbitrary mind—an enthroned God—a su-
preme will that sways the tides and currents of the world—to which all causes 
bow?  I do not deny.  I do not know—but I do not believe.”146 
It surely must be true that the question of whether God exists is not de-
void of religious content.  We are well to be reminded of St. Thomas Aqui-
nas’s answer to the question of whether any created intellect can see the es-
sence of God: 
Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act 
without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable.  
But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particu-
	
 140 ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, bk. XI, at 326–40 (John H. M’Mahon trans., George Bell & Sons 
1891) (addressing the existence of God). 
 141 PLATO, LAWS, bk. 10, at 299 (R. G. Bury trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1952) (addressing the belief 
in the gods). 
 142 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I, q. 2, art. 3, at 13 (Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947) (“I answer that, The existence of God can be proved 
in five ways.”). 
 143 E.g., Deuteronomy 6:4 (New Int’l Version) (containing the “Shema Yisra’el” prayer: “Hear, O Israel: 
The Lord is our God, the Lord is One.”); THE QUR’AN, Surah 112:1–4, (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., 
Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, Inc. 22d ed. 2007) (“Al Ikhlas, or Purity (of Faith).  In the name of Allah, 
Most Gracious, Most Merciful.  1. Say: He is Allah, the One and Only; 2. Allah, the Eternal, Ab-
solute; 3. He begets not, nor is He begotten; 4. And there is none like unto Him.”); SOUTHERN 
BAPTIST CONVENTION, THE BAPTIST FAITH AND MESSAGE (2000), http://www.sbc.net/-
bfm2000/bfm2000.asp (“II. God.  There is one and only one living and true God.”). 
 144 See, e.g., LUDWIG FEUERBACH, THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 270 (Marian Evans trans., Trübner, 
& Co. 3d ed. 1881) (“The necessary turning-point of history is therefore the open confession, that the 
consciousness of God is nothing else than the consciousness of the species . . . .”); id. at x (“God is 
man, man is God . . . .”); id. at xii (“[R]eligion takes the apparent, the superficial in Nature and hu-
manity for the essential, and hence conceives their true essence as a separate, special existence.”). 
 145 See generally STEPHAN PAPA, THE LAST MAN JAILED FOR BLASPHEMY (1998); ABNER KNEELAND, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DEFENSE OF ABNER KNEELAND, CHARGED WITH BLASPHEMY; 
BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL COURT, IN BOSTON MASS. AT THE JANUARY TERM, IN 1834, at 37 
(1834) (“To the Editor of the Trumpet. . . . Universalists believe in a god which I do not; but believe 
that their god, with all his moral attributes, (aside from nature itself,) is nothing more than a chimera 
of their own imagination.”). 
 146 4 ROBERT G. INGERSOLL, Why I Am an Agnostic., in THE WORKS OF ROBERT G. INGERSOLL 5, 63 
(The Dresden Publ’g Co. 1902). 
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lar intellect, on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the in-
tellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen 
by the bat by reason of its excess of light.147 
Beyond the foundational theological assertion that God exists, the motto 
In God we trust has further theological content on several levels.  Because the 
motto is In God we trust, and not In gods we trust, it asserts the existence of a 
unitary god, not many gods.  Because the motto is In God we trust, and not In 
god we trust, it asserts the existence of a particular, in this case a Christian, 
god.148  Because the motto is In God we trust, and not, for example, In God we 
believe, it asserts the existence of a God in which one might trust; presumably 
trust to respond to the human condition, to prayer, or to the need for inter-
vention.149  The motto thus implicitly rejects the deist belief in a divine watch-
maker who, having created the universe, stepped back.150  Finally, because 
the motto is In God we trust, and not In God some trust, it suggests unanimity—
a God in whom we trust—where increasingly none exists. 
B.  Post-Lemon: Secular Purpose 
The Aronow assertion that In God we trust has no theological impact was in 
error; it is also no longer the relevant test.  A year following Aronow, the Su-
preme Court decided Lemon, and the analysis shifted.  Lemon established a 
	
 147 AQUINAS, supra note 142, pt. 1, q. 12, art. 1, at 49. 
 148 By capitalizing “God,” the statutes indicate it is a proper noun, referring to a specific god.  See 
Mignon Fogarty, Do You Capitalize “God”?, QUICKANDDIRTYTIPS.COM (Apr. 21, 2011), 
http://www.quickanddirtytips.com/education/grammar/do-you-capitalize-god (“The name of 
any specific deity is capitalized just like any other name, so when ‘God’ is used to refer to ‘the one 
God,’ (in other words, in any monotheistic religion) it is capitalized.”).  Interestingly, and for no 
apparent grammatical reason, some authorities provide that the devil is not capitalized even when 
used as a proper noun.  See, e.g., JANE STRAUS & LESTER KAUFMAN, THE BLUE BOOK OF 
GRAMMAR AND PUNCTUATION 50 (Tom Stern ed., 11th ed. 2014) (“Do not capitalize . . . the 
devil . . . .”).  But see Capitalization Rules, LETTERS LIBRARY, http://letterslibrary.com/writing-
tips/capitalization-rules/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (“Capitalize all names for the Devil.”).   The 
capitalization of the motto varies.  The statute establishing the motto specifies the “I” and “G” as 
capital letters: “In God we trust.”  36 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).  The statutes requiring the motto on 
coins and bills specify all initial capital letters: “In God We Trust.”  31 U.S.C. §§ 5112(d)(1), 5114(b).  
Existing currency of all denominations has the motto in all capital letters: “IN GOD WE TRUST.” 
 149 See Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018, 1022 n.1 (4th Cir., 1980) (explaining that the “Motorist’s 
Prayer” on North Carolina’s state map potentially evoked a “narrowly confined intercessory sup-
plication for deity’s private attention” and intervention: “While the prayer at issue might at first 
blush seem utterly innocuous, there are doubtless many even within the main theological stream of 
the dominant religious culture of the affected populace who are at least made uncomfortable, and 
perhaps are positively offended, by the sort of narrowly confined intercessory supplication for deity’s 
private attention that it represents.”). 
 150 See Thomas Paine, Of the Religion of Deism Compared with the Christian Religion, and the Superiority of the 
Former over the Latter, THE PROSPECT; OR VIEW OF THE MORAL WORLD, 1804, reprinted in 4 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 315, 317 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed., 1908) (“When we see a 
watch, we have as positive evidence of the existence of a watchmaker, as if we saw him; and in like 
manner the creation is evidence to our reason and our senses of the existence of a Creator.”). 
	
272 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:2 
three-part test to evaluate governmental actions challenged on Establishment 
Clause grounds: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.’”151 
Focusing on the first Lemon prong, that the challenged governmental action 
must have a secular purpose, we need to consider how the required secular 
purpose is to be identified.  Here, the analysis of Professor Andrew Koppelman 
is helpful.152  He starts with the justification behind the secular purpose require-
ment: “What the state may not do—what the doctrine properly forbids it to 
do—is declare any particular religious doctrine to be the true one, or enact 
laws that clearly imply such a declaration of religious truth.”153  This he bases 
on the well-settled principles set forth in Epperson v. Arkansas: 
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in mat-
ters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.  It may not be hostile to any 
religion or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or pro-
mote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the 
militant opposite.  The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality 
between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.154 
Koppelman identifies four principle objections to the secular purpose re-
quirement, two of which relate to our discussion.   
The first is “the rubber stamp objection,” which “holds that nearly any-
thing can satisfy the secular purpose requirement, because a secular rationale 
can be imagined for almost any law.”155  Koppelman uses Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s formulation in Wallace v. Jaffree to illustrate the objection: 
If the purpose prong is intended to void those aids to sectarian institutions 
accompanied by a stated legislative purpose to aid religion, the prong will 
condemn nothing so long as the legislature utters a secular purpose and says 
nothing about aiding religion.  Thus the constitutionality of a statute may 
depend upon what the legislators put into the legislative history and, more 
importantly, what they leave out.156 
The second is “the evanescence objection,” which “claims that the ‘pur-
pose’ that the rule seeks either does not exist or is not knowable by judges.”157  
To illustrate the objection, Koppelman uses Justice Scalia: 
	
 151 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
 152 Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87 (2002). 
 153 Id. at 88. 
 154 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968). 
 155 Koppelman, supra note 152, at 88 (emphasis omitted). 
 156 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 157 Koppelman, supra note 152, at 88 (emphasis omitted).  The third and fourth objections noted by 
Koppelman are “the participation objection” which “argues that the rule makes religious people 
into second-class citizens by denying them the right to participate in the legislative process,” and 
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Justice Antonin Scalia has been the most forceful advocate of the second ob-
jection, which I have called the evanescence objection.  He argues that the 
legislative purpose upon which the prong depends either does not exist or is 
not knowable by judges, because “discerning the subjective motivation of those 
enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task.”158 
Koppelman meets the rubber stamp objection and the evanescence ob-
jection in part by advocating an objective secular purpose analysis rather 
than a subjective analysis.  “The answer to the rubber stamp and evanes-
cence objections,” he writes, “is that what government says is sometimes ob-
vious on the face of the statute.”159  This type of case makes a subjective in-
quiry unnecessary: 
Even without looking to the intent of those passing a law or the perceptions 
of those subject to it, sometimes the meaning of a state law is obvious.  It 
cannot be inappropriate for judges to recognize what is obvious to everyone 
else. . . . When the state argues that its law reflects a secular purpose, the 
appropriate response will sometimes be neither psychoanalysis of the legis-
lature nor a survey of public opinion; laughter will suffice.160 
Koppelman does not propose a narrow objective inquiry; he would let 
the reviewing court consider the context in which the statute was passed: 
The plausibility of the state’s proffered secular justification is context-de-
pendent.  The objective approach to legislative purpose does not confine the 
Court’s attention to the four corners of the statute.  The context in which 
the law was enacted is an objective fact about it, and one that the court may 
properly take into account in discerning the law’s purpose.161 
What is not clear is whether Koppelman’s broad objective inquiry would in-
clude as permitted context what we might term the legislative history of the 
challenged statute, such as the statements of legislators and the executive ac-
companying passage of the statute into law.  Apparently Professor Koppelman 
would not include the legislative history in that broader contextual analysis.  
Referring to Wallace as “the least defensible of the secular purpose decisions,” 
he observes: “This is the secular purpose opinion that relied most heavily upon 
the legislative history of the law in question.  I have argued that it is never 
appropriate to rely on such history to find a lack of secular purpose . . . .”162  
	
“the callous indifference objection” which “holds that the secular purpose requirement . . . would 
forbid the humane accommodation of religious dissenters . . . .”  Id. at 88–89 (emphases omitted). 
 158 Id. at 99 (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 159 Id. at 113. 
 160 Id. at 114–15 (noting that Professor Charles Black “pointed out long ago that the proper response 
to the solemn assertion that segregated facilities did not declare the inferiority of blacks was ‘one of 
the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers—that of laughter’” (quoting Charles L. Black, Jr., The 
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960))). 
 161 Id. at 147.   
 162 Id. at 147–48. 
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It may be true that a subjective analysis of a challenged statute will rarely 
yield information upon which a finding of unconstitutionality under the secu-
lar purpose test might be based.  Chief Justice Rehnquist was probably correct 
that legislatures have become more clever in masking their improper motives, 
that in enacting statutes to aid religion the typical legislature “utters a secular 
purpose and says nothing about aiding religion.”163  For the same reason, Jus-
tice Scalia was probably correct that “discerning the subjective motivation of 
those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible 
task.”164  And Professor Koppelman is probably correct that “sometimes the 
meaning of a state law is obvious.”165  But to say that legislatures have become 
more clever in masking their actual motivations, to say that it is almost always 
impossible to ascertain a legislature’s actual purpose, to say that it is sometimes 
clear what the meaning of a statute is, is not to say that it is always so.166  In-
deed, there is a strong case to be made that the administrative and legislative 
histories behind the placement of In God we trust on currency—the origins dur-
ing the Rebellion, the First Omission, the expansion during the McCarthy 
era, and the Second Omission—provide an example of when the subjective 
purpose of administrators and legislators can be reliably ascertained. 
In that admittedly rare case where the subjective purpose of a legislature 
enacting a challenged statute can be reliably ascertained, should it be sufficient 
for a finding of unconstitutionality?  A hypothetical helps illustrate the issue.  
Suppose an extreme anti-Muslim state legislator wants to take a stand against 
“radical Islamic terrorism.”  Acting on his illogical conflation of observant 
Muslims and terrorists, and his mistaken belief that the Tennessee coneflower 
(echinaccea tennesseensis) is necessary for the Muslim celebration of the birth of the 
Prophet Muhammad, Mawlid al-Nabi,167 he secures the passage of a law to 
	
 163 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 164 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 165 Koppelman, supra note 152, at 114.  It might be noted that there are examples where the meaning, 
that is, the effect, of a statute is quite clear even when the purpose, that is, the reason for the enact-
ment, is not.  
 166 The clumsy maneuvering of two Kentucky counties over the display of the Ten Commandments, 
described in McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 856–57 (2005), illustrates the point:   
The ACLU moved to supplement the preliminary injunction to enjoin the Counties’ third 
display, and the Counties responded with several explanations for the new version, including 
desires “to demonstrate that the Ten Commandments were part of the foundation of Amer-
ican Law and Government” and “to educate the citizens of the county regarding some of 
the documents that played a significant role in the foundation of our system of law and 
government.”  The court, however, took the objective of proclaiming the Commandments’ 
foundational value as “a religious, rather than secular, purpose” . . . and found that the as-
sertion that the Counties’ broader educational goals are secular “crumble[s] . . . upon an 
examination of the history of this litigation.”  
  Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting ACLU v. McCreary Cty., 14 F. Supp. 2d 845, 848–49 (E.D. Ky. 
2001)). 
 167 This would have been incorrect both because Mawlid al-Nabi is not a required holiday for Muslims.  
See Shaykh Muhammad Saalih al-Munajjid, Mawlid al-Nabi (the Prophet’s Birthday), ISLAM QUESTION 
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prohibit the cultivation of the Tennessee coneflower within, and the importa-
tion of the flower into, his state.  Would such a statute survive or fail the first 
prong of Lemon, that “the statute must have a secular legislative purpose”?168   
What if the legislator is candid about the reasons for the statute, and in-
cludes “whereas” clauses in the legislation that make clear its anti-Muslim ra-
tionale,169 and the rationale is repeated without dissent in the legislative debate 
and the Governor’s signing message.  Should the statute survive or fail the first 
prong of Lemon, that “the statute must have a secular legislative purpose”?170  If 
one looked objectively at the statute, finding its purpose only in terms of what 
it did—banning the echinaccea tennesseensis—and the context contained in the 
four corners of the enactment, it should be held unconstitutional.  It is true that 
the statute has no effect on religion since the sponsor, the legislature, and the 
Governor are mistaken in their belief that the Tennessee coneflower is essential 
for the Muslim observance of Mawlid al-Nabi.  The effect of the statute is 
simply to add another item to the controlled dangerous substance list, which 
the state has broad police powers to do, absent an improper motive.  But that 
goes to the second prong of Lemon, that the challenged statute’s “principal or 
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”171  
Even though they are acting on a factually incorrect assumption about the role 
of the Tennessee coneflower in the Muslim observance of Mawlid al-Nabi, the 
action is still taken with an improper purpose.  And the “whereas” statements 
in the statute surely evidence an improper purpose. 
	
AND ANSWER (July 6, 1998), https://islamqa.info/en/249 (“There is nothing in the Qur’aan to say 
that we should celebrate the Mawlid or birthday of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be 
upon him).”).  It would also appear to be incorrect because the Tennessee coneflower, being indig-
enous to only a small part of Tennessee, would not appear to have any special significance in the 
Muslim faith.  Tennessee Coneflower—No Longer Endangered, NATURE CONSERVANCY, 
https://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/northamerica/unitedstates/tennessee/ex-
plore/tennessee-coneflower.xml (last visited Dec. 31, 2017) (“The Tennessee coneflower is only 
found in cedar glades and barrens of Middle Tennessee.”). 
 168 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).  Assume for our purposes that we avoid any stand-
ing issue by having the statute challenged by a Muslim resident of the state, an American citizen by 
birth, who has for many years engaged in the business of raising, importing, and selling beautiful 
flowers, including the white flag iris. 
 169 For example: 
WHEREAS, radical Islamic terrorism poses a clear and present danger to the people of 
this State;  
WHEREAS, Islam’s goal is the destruction of Western civilization from within, and Islam 
is a cancer on our nation that needs to be cut out; 
WHEREAS, the jihadist network does exist in this State, and Muslim Americans who sub-
scribe to Islam are just as bad as ISIS; 
WHEREAS, Islam and thus radical Islamic terrorism are fostered by Mawlid al-Nabi, the 
Muslim celebration of the birth of the so-called Prophet Muhammad;  
AND WHEREAS, the celebration of Mawlid al-Nabi is impossible without the presence 
of the Tennessee coneflower (echinaccea tennesseensis). 
 170 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
 171 Id. 
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What if the legislator is clever about the reasons for the statute, and re-
mains silent about his anti-Muslim rationale?  If one looks objectively at the 
statute finding its purpose only in terms of what it does—ban the echinaccea 
tennesseensis—and the four corners of the statute, it has nothing to do with 
religion.  The effect of the statute is simply to add another item to the con-
trolled dangerous substance list, which the state has broad police powers to 
do.  Presumably, the statute would be held constitutional. 
But what of the third possibility, where the legislator is silent about the 
reasons for the statute in the statute itself, but is candid in the discussions sur-
rounding the enactment?  Assume the state representative is open about his 
motivations, but instead of inserting “whereas” clauses to explain his purpose, 
he relies upon a speech on the floor of the legislature to accomplish the same 
end.  Further assume that his rationale is repeated in the floor debate, without 
opposition, and in the Governor’s signing statement.  Here the evidence of an 
improper purpose has shifted from the four corners of the statute to the legis-
lative history.  Again, the statute does not run afoul of Lemon’s second prong, 
since it was based on an incorrect understanding of the role of the Tennessee 
coneflower in the Muslim celebration of Mawlid al-Nabi.  But if one purpose 
of the Establishment Clause is to avoid civil strife based on religious belief, 
then such a bigoted piece of legislation ought not withstand constitutional 
scrutiny merely because its proponents missed their aim.  Surely the enact-
ment itself does sufficient damage to the nation that it ought not stand.  A 
subjective review that included legislative history would achieve the proper 
result in our third hypothetical, where an objective review might not. 
Correctly conceived, the secular purpose test of Lemon ought to include 
two reviews.  The first should be: Is the legislative purpose behind the chal-
lenged statute fairly ascertainable, and if it is, is it secular?  Where the legis-
lative purpose cannot be fairly ascertained, or where the subjective review 
indicates a secular purpose, the inquiry should proceed to the second review.  
Where the legislative purpose can be fairly ascertained, and where that pur-
pose is non-secular, the statute should be declared unconstitutional.  This 
inquiry is whether a secular purpose existed as of the time of the governmen-
tal action, not whether it can be created as a post hoc rationalization of what 
the government might have thought if they had thought of it.172  Clearly, 
because of evolving legislative powers of mendacity and legitimate questions 
	
 172 See id. at 612.  In reviewing the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes, the Lemon court was clearly 
looking at the contemporaneous legislative record, not a post hoc rationalization of legislative intent:  
Inquiry into the legislative purposes of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes affords 
no basis for a conclusion that the legislative intent was to advance religion.  On the contrary, 
the statutes themselves clearly state that they are intended to enhance the quality of the 
secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws.  There is no 
reason to believe the legislatures meant anything else. . . . [W]e find nothing here that un-
dermines the stated legislative intent; it must therefore be accorded appropriate deference. 
  Id. at 613. 
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as to how often legislative purpose can fairly be identified, this first review 
would rarely be dispositive.  Nevertheless, it ought to be undertaken. 
The second review in the Lemon secular purpose test should be: Is an ob-
jective legislative purpose fairly ascertainable from the four corners of the 
statute and the context in which the legislature acted?  This review has three 
parts: (1) Is the asserted purpose in fact secular, (2) is the asserted secular 
purpose of the action fairly indicated by the language and context of the stat-
ute, and (3) is the connection between the action taken and the asserted sec-
ular purpose plausible? 
A hypothetical helps illustrate the second review.  Suppose the Iowa legis-
lature passes a bill providing for a sign at each federal highway entrance into 
the state proclaiming Jesus is the son of the Living God.  When the statute is chal-
lenged, it proves impossible to fairly ascertain a subjective legislative purpose 
because the measure is introduced without any legislative findings, is sent to 
the floor without any committee consideration, is voted upon without discus-
sion, is passed by both houses by narrow margins, and is signed by the Gover-
nor without comment.  When challenged, Iowa defends the measure by claim-
ing that its secular purpose is to honor Iowa’s son, President Herbert Hoover.   
The first part of the objective review asks if the asserted purpose is secular.  
Here, the asserted purpose for the statute—honoring President Hoover—is 
clearly secular and appropriate for government action.  The second part of the 
objective review asks if the asserted secular purpose of the statute is fairly indi-
cated by its language and context.  Here, there is no indication of the asserted 
secular purpose (or any purpose) in the language or context of the statute.  The 
proponents should have been more mendacious.  The third part of the objec-
tive review asks if the connection between the statute and the asserted secular 
purpose is plausible.  Here, the question is how the placement of Jesus is the son 
of the Living God on billboards advances the secular purpose of honoring Presi-
dent Hoover.  Even given a high degree of deference for legislative findings, of 
which there were none in our hypothetical, it must be true that this statute 
would not withstand judicial scrutiny because there is absolutely no connection 
between the challenged action and the asserted secular purpose.173 
	
 173 See Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1360–61 (2012) 
(“[T]he government’s proffered secular purpose cannot be a false rationalization for the law.  No 
court has recognized a sham secular purpose as satisfying the demands of the Establishment 
Clause.” (first citing McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 864 (2005) (“[T]he secular purpose 
required has to be genuine, not a sham . . . .”); then citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 
U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (“When a governmental entity professes a secular purpose for an arguably 
religious policy, the government’s characterization is . . . entitled to some deference.  But it is none-
theless the duty of the courts to ‘distinguis[h] a sham secular purpose from a sincere one.’” (second 
alteration in original)))).  The cited sources stand for the proposition that courts shouldn’t recognize 
sham secular purposes as satisfying the demands of the Establishment Clause, not the assertion that 
they haven’t.  See, e.g., Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996) (asserting that In 
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The third part of the inquiry asks only if a link between the governmental 
action and the secular purpose is plausibly asserted, not if it is true.  Review-
ing courts have been less than rigorous on this point.  In Hall v. Bradshaw, the 
Fourth Circuit struck down a “Motorist’s Prayer” printed by the State of 
North Carolina on roadmaps: 
Our heavenly Father, we ask this day a particular blessing as we take the 
wheel of our car.  Grant us safe passage through all the perils of travel; shelter 
those who accompany us and protect us from harm by Thy mercy; steady 
our hands and quicken our eye that we may never take another’s life; guide 
us to our destination safely, confident in the knowledge that Thy blessings 
go with us through darkness and light . . . sunshine and shower . . . forever 
and ever.  Amen.174 
North Carolina asserted, and the district court found, “that the purpose 
of the prayer was to promote highway safety, which is secular.”175  The Hall 
court correctly concluded “that the state action here does not reflect a clearly 
secular purpose but instead impermissibly sponsors religious activity.”176  But 
the court seemingly left open the possibility that a state-sponsored prayer 
could result in safer conditions on North Carolina roads:  
The district court accepted defendant’s contention that the prayer promoted 
safety, which is a legitimate secular purpose.  A prayer, however, is undeni-
ably religious and has, by its nature, both a religious purpose and effect.  
While we agree that the prayer may foster the state’s legitimate concern for 
safety of motorists, the state cannot escape the proscriptions of the Establish-
ment Clause merely by identifying a beneficial secular purpose.  The inquiry 
goes beyond this. . . . A prayer, because it is religious, does advance religion, 
and the limited nature of the encroachment does not free the state from the 
limitations of the Establishment Clause.177 
How this might have worked, neither the district court nor the Fourth Circuit 
explained. 
The post-Lemon cases on the placement of In God we trust on currency iden-
tified five secular purposes behind the challenged governmental action.  It is 
illuminating to evaluate these asserted secular purposes, using both the sub-
jective and objective reviews. 
	
God we trust serves secular purpose of fostering patriotism); O’Hair v. Blumenthal,  462 F. Supp. 19, 
20 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (finding that In God we trust on currency “served a secular ceremonial purpose 
in the obviously secular function of providing a medium of exchange.”). 
 174 Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018, 1019 (4th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 1020. 
 177 Id. at 1020–21. 
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C.  First Secular Purpose: Formalizing Our Medium of Exchange 
The first secular purpose divined by the post-Lemon courts related to the 
role of currency.  This was advanced in O’Hair and Gaylor.  Looking to Aronow, 
the O’Hair district court found “that the primary purpose of the slogan was 
secular; it served a secular ceremonial purpose in the obviously secular func-
tion of providing a medium of exchange.”178  The Gaylor court seemed to be 
getting at the same concept when, citing O’Hair, it found a secular purpose 
in that the placement of In God we trust on currency “formalizes our medium 
of exchange.”179   
As to the subjective review, neither the O’Hair court nor the Gaylor court 
offered any evidence at all, much less any evidence from the contemporane-
ous historical record, that the administrative and legislative actors who put 
In God we trust on our national currency did so to serve a secular ceremonial 
purpose related to the secular function of providing a medium of exchange, 
or to formalize our medium of exchange.   
As to the objective review, the first part asks if the asserted purpose is 
secular.  Here, while it is correct that for a nation to provide a medium of 
exchange is a secular function of government, the “secular ceremonial pur-
pose” of including In God we trust on that medium of exchange is far from 
clear, especially since the O’Hair court conceded, like the Aronow court, that 
“‘ceremonial’ and ‘patriotic’ may not be particularly apt words to describe 
the category of the national motto.”180  While one might concede that the 
purpose served by having the motto on currency is “ceremonial,” in that the 
purpose is not functional, the O’Hair court did not explain why the inclusion 
of In God we trust is a secular ceremonial purpose and not a religious ceremonial 
purpose, or offer any support for its secular purpose finding, other than a 
citation to Aronow.181 
The second part of the objective review asks if the asserted secular purpose 
of the statute is fairly indicated by its language and context.  Here, the O’Hair 
court was silent as to whether the asserted secular purpose of serving a secular 
ceremonial purpose relating to the secular function of providing a medium of 
exchange is fairly indicated by the language and context of the statute.  
The third part of the objective review asks if the connection between the 
statute and the secular purpose asserted is plausible.  Here, the O’Hair court 
	
 178 O’Hair, 462 F. Supp. at 20 (citing Aranow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242, 243 (9th Cir. 1970)).  
Other than using the word “secular” three times in the same sentence, this assertion of secular 
purpose is truly muddled.   
 179 Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing O’Hair, 462 F. Supp. at 20). 
 180 See O’Hair, 462 F. Supp. at 20 (quoting Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243). 
 181 Id. at 19–20 (agreeing with the Aronow court that the motto does not violate the Establishment 
Clause). 
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did not explain how placing In God we trust could be plausibly associated with 
serving a secular ceremonial purpose relating to the secular function of 
providing a medium of exchange.182   
As to the related Gaylor claim that the motto “formalizes our medium of 
exchange,” the objective review is equally unsupportive.  The first part of the 
objective review asks if the asserted purpose is secular.  Here, again, it is diffi-
cult to know what the court means.  The Oxford Dictionary defines “formal-
ize” to mean the act of giving something legal or formal status.183  Surely the 
Gaylor court was not claiming that the inclusion of the motto was necessary to 
give the nation’s currency legal status.  If by “formalizes our medium of ex-
change,” the court meant that the inclusion of In God we trust on currency makes 
the currency more formal—like wearing a tie or nicely polished shoes—the 
reference is simply curious.184 
The second part of the objective review asks if the asserted secular pur-
pose of the statute is fairly indicated by its language and context.  Here, the 
Gaylor court was silent as to whether the asserted secular purpose of formal-
izing our medium of exchange is fairly indicated by the language and context 
of the statute.   
The third part of the objective review asks if the connection between the 
statute and the secular purpose asserted is plausible.  Here, the Gaylor court 
did not explain how placing In God we trust could be plausibly associated with 
formalizing our medium of exchange. 
D.  Second Secular Purpose: Fostering Patriotism 
The second secular purpose divined by the post-Lemon courts was that having 
In God we trust on currency “fosters patriotism.”185  This was advanced in Gaylor.   
As to the subjective review, neither the Gaylor court nor the Aronow court 
to which it cited offered any support at all, much less any evidence from the 
contemporaneous historical record, that the administrative and legislative ac-
tors who put In God we trust on our national currency did so to foster patriotism.  
There are scattered references to patriotism in the historical record, but they 
are few in number and are either cast in terms of “Christian patriotism”186 or 
	
 182 Id. at 20 (asserting only that In God we trust has a “secular ceremonial purpose”). 
 183 Formalize, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/formalize (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2017) (“Give (something) legal or formal status.”). 
 184 Gaylor, 74 F.3d at 216 (citing O’Hair, 462 F. Supp. at 20). 
 185 Id. at 216 (citing Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243). 
 186 H. COMM. ON COINAGE, WEIGHTS, AND MEASURES, 60th CONG., TO RESTORE THE MOTTO 
“IN GOD WE TRUST” TO THE COINS OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (1908) (submitted by Rep. Wil-
liam B. McKinley).  The report stated: 
Your subcommittee is unanimous in the belief that as a Christian nation we should restore 
this motto . . . “as an outward and visible form of the inward and spiritual grace,” which 
	
Dec. 2017] CENTS AND SENSIBILITIES 281 
the patriotism of Christians,187 or seemingly distinguish In God we trust from 
patriotic slogans.188 
As to the objective review, the first part asks if the asserted purpose is 
secular.  Here, the asserted purpose of fostering patriotism is secular.  The 
second part of the objective review asks if the asserted secular purpose of the 
statute is fairly indicated by its language and context.  Here, as to whether 
the asserted secular purpose of fostering patriotism is fairly indicated by the 
language and context of the statute, the Gaylor court is silent.  
The third part of the objective review asks if the connection between the 
statute and the secular purpose asserted is plausible.  Here, neither the Gaylor 
court nor the Aronow court to which it cited explain how the inclusion of In 
God we trust on currency fosters patriotism.  The Gaylor court offers no hint 
other than a reference to the Aronow opinion, in which, it should be remem-
bered, the court conceded that “‘ceremonial’ and ‘patriotic’ may not be par-
ticularly apt words to describe the category of the national motto.”189  Nei-
ther Aronow nor Gaylor offered any support for the proposition other than the 
bare citation in Gaylor to the unsupported assertion in Aronow. 
E.  Third Secular Purpose: Expressing Confidence in the Future 
The third secular purpose divined by the post-Lemon courts was that hav-
ing In God we trust on currency “expresses confidence in the future.”190  This 
was advanced in Gaylor and Newdow.   
	
should possess and inspire American citizenship, and as an evidence to all the nations of 
the world that the best and only reliance for the perpetuation of the republican institution 
is upon a Christian patriotism, which, recognizing the universal fatherhood of God, ap-
peals to the universal brotherhood of man as the source of the authority and power of all 
just government. 
  Id. 
 187 N. W. Merrill, Letter to the Editor, Like the Atheism of France in 1790, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 
(1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 513 (1908) (“The dropping from our coins of 
the motto ‘In God we trust’ appeals to every Christian who has a spark of patriotism left in his 
heart.”). 
 188 Charles B. Thompson, Letter to the Editor, It Expresses the Nation’s Faith, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 
1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (“A motto expressive of patriotism 
has no more right upon our coins than one expressive of the faith without which a nation would 
presently find itself in the dust.  Old Glory is not too good for everyday use; neither is the grand old 
motto which has so long publicly expressed the highest faith of the great American people.”). 
 189 Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243.  This concession was repeated by the district court in O’Hair.  O’Hair, 462 
F. Supp. at 20 (quoting Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243). 
 190 Gaylor, 74 F.3d at 216 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692–93 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring)).  Similarly, the Newdow court found a secular purpose because “[governmental] acknowledge-
ments [of religion], . . . and the printing of ‘In God We Trust’ on our coins serve the secular purpose 
of . . . expressing confidence in the future . . . .”  Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(first two alterations in original) (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
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As to the subjective review, neither the Gaylor court nor the Newdow court 
offered any support at all, much less any evidence from the contemporaneous 
historical record, that the administrative and legislative actors who put In God 
we trust on our national currency did so to express confidence in the future.   
As to the objective review, the first part asks if the asserted purpose is 
secular.  Here, the asserted purpose of expressing confidence in the future 
could be secular, unless our confidence in the future is based on a particular 
religious belief.  Such a particular religious belief which produces confidence 
in the future might be indicated by a slogan such as In God we trust.     
The second part of the objective review asks if the asserted secular pur-
pose of the statute is fairly indicated by its language and context.  Here, as to 
whether the asserted secular purpose of expressing confidence in the future 
is fairly indicated by the language and context of the statute, the Gaylor and 
Newdow courts are silent.   
The third part of the objective review asks if the connection between the 
statute and the secular purpose asserted is plausible.  Here, neither the Gaylor 
court nor the Newdow court explained how the inclusion of In God we trust on 
currency “expresses confidence in the future.”  The Gaylor court offered no 
hint other than a reference to the Lynch opinion.191  In Lynch, Justice O’Con-
nor was equally unclear, asserting without explanation or support not only 
that the motto expresses confidence in the future, but that it is of a class of 
religious statements that are the only way in which such expressions are rea-
sonably possible.192  It simply is not true that the statement In God we trust and 
similar religious assertions are the only way reasonably possible in our culture 
in which to express confidence in the future.  Take, for example, Ralph 
Waldo Emerson’s declaration: 
Men are made up of potencies.  We are magnets in an iron globe.  We have 
keys to all doors.  We are all inventors, each sailing out on a voyage of dis-
covery, guided each by a private chart, of which there is no duplicate.  The 
world is all gates, all opportunities, strings of tension waiting to be 
struck . . . .193 
Indeed, a non-religious expression of confidence in the future brief enough 
to be included on currency could surely be crafted.  For example, the cur-
rency might be emblazoned with Confident in Our Future. 
	
 191 Gaylor, 74 F.3d at 216 (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692–93 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 192 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Those government acknowledgements of reli-
gion serve, in the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes 
of . . . expressing confidence in the future . . . .”). 
 193 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, LETTERS AND SOCIAL AIMS 137 (1904). 
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F.  Fourth Secular Purpose: Encouraging the Recognition of What Is Worthy 
The fourth secular purpose divined by the post-Lemon courts was that hav-
ing In God we trust on currency “encourag[es] the recognition of what is worthy 
of appreciation in society.”194  This was advanced in Newdow.   
As to the subjective review, the Newdow court did not offer any evidence 
at all, much less any support from the contemporaneous historical record, 
that the administrative and legislative actors who put In God we trust on our 
national currency did so to encourage the recognition of what is worthy of 
appreciation in society.   
As to the objective review, the first part asks if the asserted purpose is 
secular.  Here, the asserted purpose of encouraging the recognition of what 
is worthy of appreciation in society could be secular, unless what is worthy of 
appreciation in society is religious in nature.  Such a focus on religious belief 
as being what is worthy of appreciation in society might be indicated by a 
slogan such as In God we trust.  
The second part of the objective review asks if the asserted secular purpose 
of the statute is fairly indicated by its language and context.  Here, as to 
whether the asserted secular purpose of encouraging the recognition of what 
is worthy of appreciation in society is fairly indicated by the language and 
context of the statute, the Newdow court is silent. 
The third part of the objective review asks if the connection between the 
statute and the secular purpose asserted is plausible.  Here, the Newdow court 
did not explain how the inclusion of In God we trust on currency “encourages 
the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society.”  The sole au-
thority cited was Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch,195 and she pro-
vided no support for the assertion.196  
G.  Fifth Secular Purpose: Referencing Our Religious Heritage 
The fifth secular purpose divined by the post-Lemon courts was that hav-
ing In God we trust on currency “symbolizes the historical role of religion in 
our society,”197 or serves as a “reference to our religious heritage.”198  This 
was advanced in Gaylor and Newdow.   
	
 194 Newdow, 753 F.3d at 108 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693).  The Newdow court also asserted that the 
inscription of In God we trust on currency serves “the secular purpose of solemnizing public occa-
sions.”  Id. at 108 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693).  This ought not be taken as a serious argument. 
 195 Id. at 108 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693).   
 196 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693.   
 197 Gaylor, 465 U.S. at 216 (citing Lynch. 465 U.S. at 676).   
 198 Newdow, 753 F.3d at 108 (“[T]he motto, and its inclusion in the design of U.S. currency is a ‘refer-
ence to our religious heritage.’” (first quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676; and then citing County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment))).  
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As to the subjective review, neither the Gaylor court nor the Newdow court 
offered any support at all, much less any evidence from the contemporaneous 
historical record, that the administrative and legislative actors who put In God 
we trust on our national currency did so as a reference to our religious heritage.   
As to the objective review, the first part asks if the asserted purpose is secular.  
Here, the asserted purpose of recognizing the historical role of religion in our 
society might be secular.  But the historical record surrounding the placement 
of In God we trust on our currency is so completely about recognizing only the 
role of the Christian religion in our society, and the tone of the history sounds 
so strongly in terms of advocacy and not historical recognition, that a strong 
argument could be made that the asserted purpose is religious, not secular.   
The second part of the objective review asks if the asserted secular pur-
pose of the statute is fairly indicated by its language and context.  Here, as to 
whether the asserted secular purpose of recognizing the historical role of re-
ligion in our society is fairly indicated by the language and context of the 
statute, the Gaylor and Newdow courts were silent.    
The third part of the objective review asks if the connection between the 
statute and the secular purpose asserted is plausible.  Here, neither the Gaylor 
court nor the Newdow court explained how the inclusion of In God we trust on 
currency serves as a “reference to our religious heritage.”   
H.  Eluding Secular Purpose: De Minimis, Ceremonial Deism, and De Facto 
Establishment 
Some courts and commentators have attempted to elude the result of the 
secular purpose analysis by suggesting that a range of governmental actions 
involving religious expression are not worthy of our attention because they 
are inconsequential, because their religious content is somehow not what it 
appears, or because they are otherwise somehow rendered constitutional. 
Thus one commentator opined that having the motto on currency was “of 
no practical significance,” and was a “meaningless . . . act of ceremonial obei-
sance,” perhaps to be taken by some as suggesting it should be constitutionally 
differentiated from some “[g]overnment expenditures of tax-raised funds for 
religious institutions” by the magnitude of the expenditures.199  Another advo-
cated for a de minimis analysis, under which “trifling” violations might avoid the 
heavy hand of the federal courts: 
	
 199 PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 169, 238.  The author of the cited source believed the motto was unim-
portant: 
Items such as the reference to God on coins . . . are insignificant to the point of being triv-
ial.  Government expenditures of tax-raised funds for religious institutions cannot easily be 
justified on the basis of so meaningless an act of ceremonial obeisance.  (It is difficult to 
understand why true religionists do not resent, rather than approve, this marriage of God 
and Mammon.) 
  Id. at 169 (footnote omitted).   
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[T]o say . . . that there is no place at all for de minimis may turn out to be 
embarrassingly extreme, for the number of small instances of government 
support, or at least favorable recognition, of religious activity is so great and 
they are so pervasive that they go unnoticed until attention is drawn to them.  
 . . . [T]he Supreme Court may yet be glad to have available a doctrine 
that some matters are really so trifling that they do not set in action the some-
what ponderous machinery of the Federal Government.  A few months after 
the McCollum decision was handed down, a member of the board of edu-
cation in an upstate New York village had occasion to visit his school.  
Christmas was coming, and small children has pasted up in their classrooms 
various pictures—laden camels, and wise men, and a star with spreading 
rays, and cut-outs of a canonized Lycian bishop of the early Christian 
church, named Nicholas, white bearded and dressed for sleighing in red gar-
ments.  As the trustee had learned of the McCollum case he fell to thinking 
about these clearly sectarian manifestations to which the children of the dis-
trict, under threat of the truancy laws, were unavoidably subjected.  He won-
dered curiously whether a federal court, if asked, would send a marshal, 
heavy with the power and majesty of these United States, to scrape the chil-
dren’s pasted pictures from the schoolroom walls.200 
The O’Hair court quoted Justice Brennan as he sought to avoid the de 
minimis characterization in favor of an argument that frequent repetition 
somehow purged In God we trust of its religious meaning:  
It is not that the use of [In God we trust] can be dismissed as “de mini-
mis” . . . The truth is that we have simply interwoven the motto so deeply 
into the fabric of our civil polity that its present use may well not present that 
type of involvement which the First Amendment prohibits.201   
It is a curious argument that repetition transforms a religious statement into 
a secular one. 
Related is the “ceremonial deism” argument advanced in both Gaylor and 
Newdow.  Thus the Gaylor court suggested: “The motto’s primary effect is not 
to advance religion; instead, it is a form of ‘ceremonial deism’ which through 
historical usage and ubiquity cannot be reasonably understood to convey gov-
ernment approval of religious belief.”202  And the Newdow court cited Justice 
Brennan’s dissent in Lynch in which he argued the motto In God we trust is “a 
form [of] ‘ceremonial deism,’ protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny 
chiefly because [it has] lost through rote repetition any significant religious 
content.”203  The argument that repetition eliminates any significant religious 
content from the thing being repeated is curious.  The Catholic Church at 
	
 200 PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 187–88 (first and third alterations in original) (quoting Arthur E. Suth-
erland, Jr., Due Process and Disestablishment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1306, 1343–44 (1949)). 
 201 O’Hair v. Blumenthal, 462 F. Supp. 19, 20 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (second alteration in original) (citing 
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 202 Gaylor, 74 F.3d at 216 (citing Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625). 
 203 Newdow, 753 F.3d at 108 (alterations in original) (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing)).  
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least does not believe that repetition itself diminishes religious effect.204  And 
generations of school children who recited the Pledge of Allegiance at the start 
of every school day might also wonder about the value of the exercise if the 
Pledge lost through rote repetition any significant patriotic content. 
In contrast, some writers have acknowledged the clear religious purposes 
in some of these practices.  Dean Jesse Choper wrote: 
The placement of “In God We Trust” on coins and currency . . . seems to 
have no real purpose other than a religious one.  Moreover, the proclama-
tions by almost all our Presidents of national days of Thanksgiving to “Al-
mighty God” only seem fairly characterized as having a religious purpose.  If 
one takes seriously the Court’s doctrine that a religious purpose alone pro-
duces a violation of the establishment clause, these and many other longstand-
ing practices in our society must be held invalid.205 
Professor Mark Tushnet has written that some practices “plainly have reli-
gious purposes, and no good is done by pretending, as the Court came close 
to doing in Lynch, that the ordinary understanding of ‘purpose’ somehow al-
lows a holding that these practices do not have religious purposes.”206 
Both writers suggested ways to avoid the wholesale invalidity of such 
practices.  Dean Choper noted that “the Supreme Court simply ignores its 
own articulated test when it wishes to uphold a deeply engrained national 
practice that clashes with this doctrine,”207 and suggested the adoption of a 
rule: “Government action should be held to violate the establishment clause 
if it meets two criteria: first, if its purpose is to aid religion; and second, if it 
significantly endangers religious liberty in some way by coercing, compro-
mising, or influencing religious beliefs.”208  Presumably, even if a reviewing 
court acknowledged that the placement of In God we trust on currency had a 
	
 204 Pope John Paul II, Apostolic Letter Rosarium Virginis Mariae [Rosary of the Virgin Mary] ¶ 26, October 
16, 2002, https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_letters/2002/documents/hf_jp-
ii_apl_20021016_rosarium-virginis-mariae.html.  Pope John Paul II explained: 
One thing is clear: although the repeated Hail Mary is addressed directly to Mary, it is to 
Jesus that the act of love is ultimately directed, with her and through her.  The repetition 
is nourished by the desire to be conformed ever more completely to Christ, the true pro-
gramme of the Christian life. . . . The Rosary helps us to be conformed ever more closely 
to Christ until we attain true holiness. 
  Id. 
 205 Jesse H. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 947 (1986). 
 206 Mark V. Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 997, 1004 (1986).  Tushnet cited the tension between the Lynch majority, which held 
that display of a crèche in a shopping district had a secular purpose when viewed “in [its] context,” 
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671, 679 (majority opinion), and Justice Blackmun, who argued that viewing the 
crèche in this way “relegated [it] to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season, useful for 
commercial purposes, but devoid of any inherent meaning,” id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
Tushnet, supra, at 1004 n.20.     
 207 Choper, supra note 205, at 947.   
 208 Id. at 948.   
	
Dec. 2017] CENTS AND SENSIBILITIES 287 
religious purpose, it would not find that the practice significantly endangers 
religious liberty by coercing, compromising, or influencing religious beliefs, 
and the practice would be upheld. 
Professor Tushnet approached the situation differently, using a “de facto 
establishment” analysis.  Suggesting that reviewing courts would approve 
such practices, he suggested that constitutional doctrine be rewritten to per-
mit the result: 
[I]t is unclear why the establishment clause should be interpreted to prohibit 
these de facto establishments.  The Court’s recent behavior confirms that, 
whatever the doctrinal rubric, such practices are almost certain to be found 
constitutional anyway.  One might as well candidly acknowledge, in our doc-
trinal structure, that de facto establishments are constitutionally permissible.209 
Professor Tushnet acknowledged, but did not resolve, the next question: how 
to define the contours of the de facto establishment exception.  One possibil-
ity, toward which he evidenced skepticism, was that “de facto establishments 
have a long pedigree.”210  Another was “that the religious content of de facto 
establishments, while undeniably present, is relatively slight.”211 
Professor Koppelman has endorsed Tushnet’s de facto establishment 
proposal: 
The . . . answer is to acknowledge the bland “de facto establishment of religion” 
that prevails in the United States.  It is true that its religious significance is 
substantially drained by its antiquity and familiarity, but Professor Mark Tush-
net is right that “[t]hese practices plainly have religious purposes, and no good 
is done by pretending . . . that the ordinary understanding of ‘purpose’ some-
how allows a holding that the practices do not have religious purposes.”212 
According to Koppelman, this exception should insulate the placement of In 
God we trust on our currency from constitutional review: 
The “de facto establishment” should be understood as an exception to the 
Establishment Clause, confined to public rituals of long standing whose reli-
gious content is sufficiently bland.  Some aspects of the de facto establish-
ment, such as the names of cities and the placement of “In God We Trust” 
on the currency, have become drained of religious significance in the minds 
of many Americans.213   
Curiously, for an act drained of religious significance, he also makes refer-
ence to Professor Richard Fallon’s suggestion that “the anger and resentment 
	
 209 Tushnet, supra note 206, at 1004. 
 210 Id.  
 211 Id. at 1005. 
 212 Koppelman, supra note 152, at 152–153 (second and third alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) 
(first quoting MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND 
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 11 (1965); and then quoting Tushnet, 
supra note 206, at 1004). 
 213 Id. at 153 (footnote omitted) (citing Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242, 243 (9th Cir. 1970)). 
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that judicial rejection of these practices would arouse” means “that institu-
tional self-interest probably plays a role in insulating these practices from Es-
tablishment Clause challenge.”214 
Professor Koppelman concludes: “Have I just given away the store?  I do 
not think so.  The exception is one that in its nature cannot allow the creation 
of new instances.”215  He justifies this exception in two ways.  First, quoting 
Hall, he makes the excuse that “ceremonial references to the Deity on coin-
age and the like”: 
may be treated as “grandfathered” exceptions to the general prohibition 
against officially composed theological statements.  Present at the very foun-
dations, few in number, fixed and invariable in form, confined in display and 
utterance to a limited set of official occasions and objects, they can safely 
occupy their own small, unexpandable niche in Establishment Clause doc-
trine.  Their singular quality of being rooted in our history and their inca-
pacity to tempt competing or complementary theological formulations by 
contemporary agencies of government sufficiently cabin them in and distin-
guish then [sic] from new, open-form theological expressions published un-
der the aegis of the state.216 
Of course, Professor Koppelman’s justification for the de facto establishment 
exception does not fit the history of the placement of In God we trust on our 
currency.  The practice was not “[p]resent at the very foundations.”217  The 
first placement did not occur until 1864;218 the last statutory endorsement of 
the practice did not occur until 2008.219  The practice has not produced vio-
lations which are “few in number.”220  In Fiscal Year 2015 alone, over twenty-
three billion circulating notes and coins bore the inscription In God we trust.221  
The practice has not been “fixed and invariable in form.”222  Expansions of 
the practice occurred in 1908,223 1955,224 and 2008.225  The practice has not 
been “confined in display and utterance to a limited set of official occasions 
	
 214 Id. at 153 (citing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 54–55 (2001)).  
 215 Id.  
 216 Id. at 153 n.242 (alteration in original) (quoting Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018, 1023 n.2 (4th 
Cir. 1980)). 
 217 Id.  
 218  1896 REPORT, supra note 9. 
 219  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 623(a)(2), 121 Stat. 1844, 2018 
(2007) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5112(n)(2)(F) (2012)). 
 220 Koppelman, supra note 152, at 153 n.242 (quoting Hall, 630 F.2d at 1023 n.2). 
 221 In FY 2015, the United States Mint produced 16.2 billion circulating coins.   Jeppson, supra note 
11.  In FY 2015, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing produced over seven billion regular notes.  
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, supra note 11.  
 222 Koppelman, supra note 152, at 153 n.242 (quoting Hall, 630 F.2d at 1023 n.2). 
 223 Act of May 18, 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-120, 35 Stat. 164.  
 224 Act of July 11, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-140, 69 Stat. 290 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5114 
(2012)) (providing that “all United States currency shall bear the inscription ‘In God We Trust’”).  
 225 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 623(a), 121 Stat. 1844, 2018 (2007) 
(codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5112(n)(2)(F) (2012)).  
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and objects.”226  The use of currency bearing In God we trust is not limited to 
official occasions, or “a limited set of . . . objects” unless one considers the set 
of twenty-three billion circulating notes and coins from Fiscal Year 2015 “lim-
ited.”  The practice has not occupied an “unexpandable niche in Establish-
ment Clause doctrine.”227  As noted, the practice was expanded in 1908, 1955, 
and 2008.  The placement of the motto on money has been used as a justifi-
cation for the governmental placement of the motto in additional ways: on 
stamps,228 police cars,229 and government buildings,230 for example. 
	
 226 Koppelman, supra note 152, at 153 n.242 (quoting Hall, 630 F.2d at 1023 n.2). 
 227 Id. (quoting Hall, 630 F.2d at 1023 n.2). 
 228 See 101 CONG. REC. 9448 (1955) (statement of Sen. Carlson) (offering a bill to have In God We Trust 
added to newly issued postage stamps). 
 229 For example, in 2014 a Missouri sheriff had the slogan “In God We Trust” put on the bumpers of 
department cars.  Steve Pokin, A Miracle! Both Sides Like ‘In God We Trust’ Story, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-
LEADER (June 2, 2015), http://www.news-leader.com/story/news/local/ozarks/2015/06/02/ 
miracle-sides-like-god-trust-story/28373773/.  Several citizens complained, including Laura 
Entwisle, who wrote to the local newspaper: “If taxpayer money was used, is it legal?  I’m asking 
because I am not of a faith that identifies with the name ‘God’ and I don’t think I’m the only one.”  
Steve Pokin, Answer Man: Who Decided to Put ‘In God We Trust’ on Cars?, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER 
(May 26, 2015), http://www.news-leader.com/story/news/local/ozarks/2015/05/26/answer-
man-decided-put-god-trust-cars/27985807/.  In an online poll, the local newspaper reported that 
a majority of the respondents thought the sheriff should not have put the slogan on the cars.  Id. 
(reporting 44% for “yes” and 56% for “no” in response to a poll asking whether “Green County 
Sheriff Arnott should have put ‘In God we trust’ on deputies’ cars”).  The sheriff’s response: “I’m 
guessing she is offended by it.  If that’s the case.  I’m hoping that she does not use any of our 
currency either.”  Id.  For additional stories of police officers placing In God we trust on their patrol 
cars, see, for example, Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, Police Agencies Defy Critics and Show ‘In 
God We Trust,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/us/police-
agencies-defy-critics-and-show-in-god-we-trust.html?mcubz=1&_r=0 (“‘If it’s on my money and 
it’s on the state flag, I can put it on a patrol car,’ said [Polk County, Georgia,] Sheriff [Johnny] 
Moats . . . . ‘I don’t know why an atheist is so upset about us putting up “In God We Trust,”’ Sheriff 
Moats said.  ‘I’m not saying that they trust God.  I’m saying that we, as the guys in this department 
who put this on our cars, we trust in God.  And why is that a bad thing?  Even if you don’t believe, 
you know God’s all about good.’”); Elahe Izadi, Why Officers Are Putting ‘In God We Trust’ Bumper 
Stickers on Their Patrol Cars, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
acts-of-faith/wp/2015/08/05/why-officers-are-putting-in-god-we-trust-bumper-stickers-on-their-
patrol-cars/ (“‘I’m not hiding from the fact that it’s religious and I’m not trying to make an excuse 
for the fact that it’s religious,’ [Bay County, Florida, Sheriff Frank McKeithen] said.  ‘Morals and 
ethics—that’s kind of what law enforcement’s supposed to be about’ . . . . McKeithen added: ‘You 
don’t have to be a Christian to trust in God, because you think of all the people in this world that 
bad things happen to them and at the last moment, they say, “Oh God; please God help me.”’”); 
Jasmine Spencer, ‘In God We Trust’ Placed on Davidson County Sheriff’s Office Patrol Vehicles, FOX8 (Feb. 
8, 2016), http://myfox8.com/2016/02/08/in-god-we-trust-on-the-back-of-davidson-county-sher-
iffs-office-patrol-vehicles/ (“‘It was formed on Judeo-Christian beliefs, on our money and on a lot 
of places, on the courthouses and so forth,’ [Davidson County, North Carolina, Sheriff David] 
Grice said.  ‘It’s something we believe in.’ . . . ‘I think when you put it on the back on [sic] of that 
police car it’s reminding people you know that God has been very good to our nation[,]’ [said Pastor 
Mike McDaniel of Currytown Baptist Church].”). 
230 The Thurston County, Nebraska Board of Supervisors voted 4-2 to display “In God We Trust” in 
the board room of the county courthouse.  Bret Hayworth, Northeast Nebraska County to Add “In God 
We Trust” in Courthouse, SIOUX CITY J. (Aug. 23, 2016), http://siouxcityjournal.com/lifestyles/faith-
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For his second justification for a de facto establishment exception, Professor 
Koppelman takes comfort in the fact that the Republic has survived: 
The other point that can be made on behalf of “grandfathering” is that any 
deviation from the norm that it tolerates cannot be very dangerous, because 
the supposed dangers have not yet materialized.  The current balance of power 
between church and state “is not the only acceptable balance that might be 
struck, but it is acceptable at this stage in history, because the earmark of an 
inappropriate balance—tyranny by either church or state—is not evident.”231 
One can only wonder, if the occurrence of state tyranny is the appropriate 
test, whether states ought to be able to force school children to recite the 
Pledge of Allegiance,232 drivers to display “Live Free or Die” on their license 
plates,233 or applicants to be a notary public to profess a belief in God.234  
After all, such deviations from the constitutional guarantees did not result in 
a general theocratic tyranny, either. 
Whether the argument is that the placement of In God we trust on currency 
is not worth worrying about because it is inconsequential, because its religious 
content is somehow not what it appears, or because it was otherwise rendered 
constitutional under a de facto establishment analysis, the appropriate re-
sponse is essentially the same.  It was nicely framed by Leo Pfeffer more than 
six decades ago, in response to Professor Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr.’s advocacy 
of a de minimis exception.  Pfeffer began his rebuttal by helping the reader re-
member the context in which members of disfavored religious groups view the 
assertedly de minimis practice: 
	
and-values/religion/northeast-nebraska-county-to-add-in-god-we-trust-in/article_07b60296-
f4d1-5117-9d58-cbb1d63916a4.html.  One supervisor who voted in the minority  
said displaying the motto is not good public policy, since it violates the separation of church 
and state.  He said religious symbols such as a Christian cross or Jewish Star of David 
should not be displayed in public buildings.  “It is just like having a cross on the wall.  That 
will lead to the interpretation . . . that all our judgments are based on what our religious 
beliefs are.  I don’t have problems with people who have a religious belief.  But it doesn’t 
belong on a county building wall.” 
 Id.  A supervisor who voted in the majority expressed a different view: “It is on our currency . . . . I 
don’t feel there is anything wrong with displaying that.  It is not putting any religion down . . . I am 
not trying to offend anybody.”  Id.  The board acted following remarks by an organizer who “is 
traveling the state, encouraging county elected officials to add the religious-motivated phrase in pub-
lic buildings.”  Id.  The president of the Pacific Justice Institute, “a conservative legal defense organ-
ization, [which] stands ready to defend any lawsuit that would be filed against the county taking that 
step,” reported, “We are seeing an explosion of municipalities choosing to do this . . . .”  Id. 
 231 Koppelman, supra note 152, at 153 n.242 (quoting Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, 
and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REV. 807, 826 (1999)). 
 232 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding West Virginia law com-
pelling flag salute and recitation of Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutional). 
 233 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding New Hampshire statute with such a re-
quirement unconstitutional). 
 234 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (declaring Maryland statute with this requirement 
unconstitutional). 
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Yet what is “trifling” or de minimis to a dominant sect may be of vital im-
portance to a minority sect.  To the Christian, Jewish concern over Christo-
logical Christmas and Easter observances in the public schools may appear 
“trifling,” as it does to Professor Sutherland; but . . . to many Jews it is not 
“trifling.”  Protestant judges have decided that the differences between the 
King James and the Douay versions of the Bible are so small as to be negligi-
ble or “trifling”; yet Catholic children have been expelled, flogged, and oth-
erwise persecuted, and indeed lives have been lost, because to Catholics the 
differences are not de minimis.  Children of Jehovah’s Witnesses have suffered 
persecution for refusing to engage in the “trifling” ceremonial act of saluting 
the American flag; and . . . dissenting Christians were jailed for refusing to 
contribute “trifling” sums to the established state churches.  To an atheist all 
Christianity—and indeed all religion—would be categorized de minimis.235 
Pfeffer concluded his rebuttal of the de minimis rule by speaking of the nature 
of the problem to which the rule would be applied: 
 The rule of de minimis is a rule of convenience.  The monetary loss suf-
fered by a taxpayer as the result of a slight waste of public funds may be too 
insignificant to warrant invoking the judicial process to obtain redress.  The 
expense to government incurred in judicially determining whether a partic-
ular government expenditure of a small sum of money is legal, may so far 
exceed the attacked expenditure that it is more economical to allow the un-
lawful expenditure to go unchallenged.  But different considerations underlie 
an expenditure attacked under the separation or religious liberty guaranty.  
The right sought to be vindicated is a religious right, not an economic one, 
and it is therefore inappropriate to measure it in economic terms.  When the 
Federal or state government makes any appropriation, no matter how slight, 
for religious purposes, religion has come “within the cognizance of Civil 
Government.”  It is for that reason that Madison warned 
 That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute 
three pence only of his property for the support of any one establish-
ment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all 
cases whatsoever.236  
In the next Part, we consider several reform options for our currency.  
The first eliminates the problem of having a motto that fails the Lemon secular 
purpose test.  The second accepts the rationale that the placement of the 
motto on our currency was a reference to our religious heritage and charts a 
new direction for our currency that would implement that rationale in a way 
that is truly respectful of the complete history and diversity of the nation on 
matters religious. 
  
	
 235 PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 188 (endnotes omitted) (quoting Sutherland, supra note 200, at 1344). 
 236 Id. at 167–68 (endnotes omitted) (quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE 
AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS ¶ 3 (1785)). 
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III.  “THIS WOULD MAKE A BEAUTIFUL COIN, TO WHICH NO  
POSSIBLE CITIZEN COULD OBJECT”: HARMONIZING OUR  
CURRENCY WITH OUR RICH NATIONAL HERITAGE AND 
CONTEMPORARY DIVERSITY ON MATTERS RELIGIOUS 
The administrative and legislative historical record is quite clear that the 
placement of In God we trust on our currency had a religious, not a secular, 
purpose.  The statutes thus fail the first part of the Lemon test and are not 
constitutional.237  But even if the courts are not convinced to do a more com-
prehensive and thoughtful analysis and find the placement of the motto on 
currency to violate the First Amendment, the practice ought to be changed 
as a prudential matter because the placement is needlessly disrespectful of so 
many American citizens. 
The Newdow court found a secular legislative purpose in the dicta of the 
Supreme Court “that the motto, and its inclusion in the design of U.S. cur-
rency is a ‘reference to our religious heritage.’”238  It seems clear from the 
administrative and legislative history that the motto In God we trust has never 
been such a secular celebration of our religious heritage.239  This is in part 
true because the religious heritage of the nation has always been broader 
than the favored Christian majority historically associated with the motto.  
But at the times of the various administrative and legislative enactments we 
have reviewed it was not seen as a problem because in terms of belief on 
matters religious America was a very different place than it is today.240 
	
 237 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (“First, the statute must have a secular legis-
lative purpose . . . .”).  We leave for a future discussion whether the placement of In God we trust on 
currency fails the second prong of the Lemon test, that “its principal or primary effect must be one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . .”  Id.  There is an argument that by seeming to some 
to confirm that this is a “Christian nation,” the placement of the motto on currency has the primary 
effect of advancing religion.  Certainly that was the intention of some of its proponents.  See supra 
notes 57–90 and accompanying text.  
 238 Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2014) (first quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 676 (1984); and then citing Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989)). 
 239  See supra Part I. 
 240 To be clear, America was never as monolithically Christian as the legislative history of the motto In 
God we trust would indicate.  Beyond the range of indigenous Native American religions, other faith 
traditions were brought to America with early immigrants.  African slaves brought with them their 
religious and faith traditions. Judith Weisenfeld, Religion in African American History, OXFORD RES. 
ENCYCLOPEDIAS: AM. HIST. (Mar. 2015), http://americanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/-
acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-24 (“African traditional religions 
dominated among those pressed into New World slavery . . . .”)  The organized Jewish faith in 
America dates to the middle of the seventeenth century.  Congregation Shearith Israel in New York 
City dates to 1654.  1 JACOB RADER MARCUS, EARLY AMERICAN JEWRY 24, 55 (1951).  The 
Muslim presence was documented a few decades later.  Peter Manseau, What Happened to America’s 
First Muslims?, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-
manseau/what-happened-to-americas-first-muslims_b_6809326.html.  Non-believers were pre-
sent in early America. LEIGH ERIC SCHMIDT, VILLAGE ATHEISTS: HOW AMERICA’S 
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One hundred fifty-six years ago, in 1861, when Reverend Mark Watkin-
son wrote to suggest the placement of a religious saying on our coins to “re-
lieve us from the ignominy of heathenism,” America was an overwhelmingly 
Christian nation.241  One hundred ten years ago, in 1907, when President 
Theodore Roosevelt tried without success to remove the motto from our 
coins, one of his congressional opponents could assert without being ridiculed 
that “we are one in the recognition of a supreme and all-wise God.”242  Sixty-
three years ago, in 1954, when President Dwight Eisenhower celebrated the 
fact that “[f]rom this day forward, the millions of our school children will 
daily proclaim in every city and town, every village and rural school house, 
the dedication of our nation and our people to the Almighty,” America was 
still religiously uniform enough to mute criticism of the measure.243 
But in the second decade of the twenty-first century the United States has 
evolved in religious terms from where we were in 1861, 1907, or 1954.  We 
have become a strikingly diverse society on matters of religious belief.  Simply 
put, in our modern society a significant number of American citizens do not 
trust in the Christian God. 
Today, only a minority of adult Americans identify as Protestant 
Christians.244  Approximately fifty-six million of us are “unaffiliated”: 
	
UNBELIEVERS MADE THEIR WAY IN A GODLY NATION 21 (2016) (“Certainly infidels and free-
thinkers constituted a distinct minority in nineteenth-century America, as do avowed atheists and 
agnostics in the early twenty-first century, but the number of unbelievers was not inconsequential 
then—just as it is not inconsequential now.”).  But, ascertaining the number of atheists is difficult 
because of the social pressure to appear religious.  For example, speaking of “the social impropriety 
of overt unbelief, Professor Leigh Schmidt cites the Earl of Chesterfeield’s counsel in the mid-eight-
eenth century: “[E]very man is the worse looked upon, and the less trusted, for being thought to 
have no religion; . . . a wise Atheist (if such a thing there is) would, for his own interest, and char-
acter in this world, pretend to some religion.” Id. at 4 (quoting 1 EARL OF CHESTERFIELD, LETTERS 
TO HIS SON ON THE ART OF BECOMING A MAN OF THE WORLD AND A GENTLEMAN 275–76 
(Chesterfield Press, 1917)).  Many Asian immigrants through the nineteenth century brought non-
Christian religious beliefs.  Tony Carnes, Asain American Religions, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIAS: 
RELIGION (July 2017), http://religion.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.-
001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-502 (noting Buddhist, Shinto, Taoist, and Confucioan ele-
ments within the Asian-American population, in additon to Christian elements).  The history of 
Hindus in America, at least in an organized sense, can be said to date to 1893, when Swami Vive-
kananda spoke to the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago.  Swami Vivekananda, Addresses at 
the Parliament of Religions, RAMAKRISHNA-VIVEKANANDA CTR. OF N.Y. (Sept. 11, 1893), 
https://www.ramakrishna.org/chcgfull.htm. 
 241 1896 REPORT, supra note 9. 
 242 42 CONG. REC. 3387 (1908) (statement of Rep. Edwards). 
 243 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill to Include the 
Words “Under God” in the Pledge to the Flag (June 14, 1954), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1954, at 563 (1960). 
 244 PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE: CHRISTIANS DECLINE 
SHARPLY AS SHARE OF POPULATION; UNAFFILIATED AND OTHER FAITHS CONTINUE TO GROW 4 
(2015) [hereinafter 2015 PEW RESEARCH SURVEY], http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/up-
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atheists, agnostics, and those who identify as “nothing in particular.”245  The 
unaffiliated outnumber both Catholics and mainline Protestants.246  Some 
14.5 million adult Americans identify with non-Christian faiths: 2.2 million 
Muslims, 4.7 million Jews, 1.7 million Hindus, and 1.7 million Buddhists.247   
The research suggests that our religious diversity is going to increase.  Be-
tween 2007 and 2014 Protestant Christians lost their majority status.248  Dur-
ing the same period the percentages for Christians overall declined, as did 
the percentages for Christian subgroups of Protestants, Catholics, evangeli-
cals, mainline Protestants, historically black Christian groups, Orthodox 
Christians, and Mormons.249  Over the same period, the percentages for 
Jews, Muslims, Hindus, atheists, agnostics, and those responding “nothing in 
particular” all increased.250  Looking at age cohorts251 and marriage pat-
terns252 suggests our diversity on matters of religion will only increase. 
When he suggested the inclusion of a religious motto on our coins, Rever-
end Watkinson asserted: “This would make a beautiful coin, to which no possi-
ble citizen could object.”253  The nation has changed in ways Reverend Wat-
kinson could not have imagined.  People are citizens who he might not have 
	
loads/sites/11/2015/05/RLS-08-26-full-report.pdf (reporting 46.5% of adults identifying as Chris-
tian protestants).  The study uses nearly 245 million as the number of adult Americans.  Id. at 7 n.7.   
 245 Id. at 10.  The study reports 2014 allocations of 3.1% (atheists), 4.0% (agnostics), and 15.8% (noth-
ing in particular), for an aggregate unaffiliated score of 22.8%.  Id. at 4.  Using the 245 million 
figure for American adults, these translate into 7.6 million atheists, 9.8 million agnostics, and 38.7 
million who identified as “nothing in particular.” 
 246 Id. at 4 (reporting 20.8% of adults identifying as Catholics and 14.7% as mainline Protestants, com-
pared to 3.1% identifying as atheists, 4.0% as agnostics, and 15.8% as “nothing in particular,” for 
an unaffiliated total of 22.8%).  
 247 Id.  The study uses an overall adult population of nearly 245 million, id. at 7, with 2014 allocations 
of 0.9% (Muslim), 0.7% (Buddhist), and 0.7% (Hindu), id. at 4.  Some 4,655,000 people, 1.9% of 
the total, are identified as Jewish.  Id. 
 248 Id.  Protestant Christians went from 51.3% in 2007 to 46.5% in 2014, indicating that the Protestant 
Christian population declined by 4.8%.  Id. 
 249  Id.  Within the Christian grouping, only the Jehovah’s Witness and “other Christian” categories 
increased; in percenage terms: from 0.7% to 0.8% and 0.3% to 0.4% respectively.  Id. 
 250 Within the non-Christian grouping, Jewish respondents increased from 1.7% to 1.9%, Muslims 
from 0.4% to 0.9%, and Hindus from 0.4% to 0.7%.  Id.  Atheists increased from 1.6% to 3.1%, 
agnostics from 2.4% to 4%, and “nothing in particular” from 12.1% to 15.8%.  Id. 
 251 Id. at 11 (“One of the most important factors in the declining share of Christians and the growth of 
the ‘nones’ is generational replacement.  As the Millennial generation enters adulthood, its mem-
bers display much lower levels of religious affiliation, including less connection with Christian 
churches, than older generations.  Fully 36% of young Millennials (those between the ages of 18 
and 24) are religiously unaffiliated, as are 34% of older Millennials (ages 25-33).  And fewer than 
six-in-ten Millennials identify with any branch of Christianity, compared with seven-in-ten or more 
among older generations . . . .”). 
 252 Id. at 5 (reporting that 39% of those married since 2010 are in religiously mixed marriages, com-
pared to only 19% in 1960, and that nearly 20% of marriages since 2010 include one religiously 
unaffiliated partner who married one Christian partner, compared to only 5% in 1960). 
 253 1896 REPORT, supra note 9. 
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thought possible, and the inclusion of In God we trust on the nation’s currency is 
fundamentally inconsistent with their beliefs on matters of religion.  Of course, 
there were some citizens at the time of the Rebellion who would have objected 
to a Christian religious motto, had they been considered worthy to comment.  
There are many more today. 
So where do we go from here?  There are several options.  The easiest 
would be to simply remove the motto In God we trust from our currency.  The 
problem with this straightforward course of action—ironic given the judicial 
insistence that having the motto on currency fulfills a secular purpose—is 
that some Christian groups would oppose the move as a defeat for their reli-
gion and a victory for the forces of “infidelity,”254 and as an invitation to 
divine retribution.255  There is perhaps something to be said for avoiding if 
possible the apocalyptic conflict described by one proponent at the time of 
the First Omission: “Let us nail our colors to the masthead and go on to 
either defeat or victory, with our banners flying and with our trust in the 
living God emblazoned upon our coinage!”256 
But what if the motto on our coins could be reworked to honestly fulfill 
the Newdow court’s finding “that the motto, and its inclusion in the design of 
U.S. currency, is a ‘reference to our religious heritage.’”257  What if we redid 
our currency to honor the totality of our heritage—and our contemporary 
diversity—on matters religious?  It could be done. 
How this might be done is suggested by the 50 State Quarters Program of 
the United States Mint, which “has been hailed as the most successful coin 
program in the Nation’s history.”258  The program was designed “to promote 
knowledge of individual states, their history and geography, and the rich 
diversity of the national heritage among the youth of the United States.”259  
Through the program, over the period from 1999 through 2008 the Mint 
issued fifty commemorative state quarters, each with a unique design.  Almost 
thirty-five billion quarters were produced with the commemorative designs.260   
	
 254 See 42 CONG. REC.  3389 (1908) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (“Let us . . . fight infidelity until it is 
literally stamped out in our country.”). 
 255 See 153 CONG. REC. 23,970 (2007) (statement of Rep. Burton) (“Once you start turning your back 
on the good Lord, I think you are going to reap the whirlwind . . . .”). 
 256 Elizabeth A. Reed, Letter to the Editor, Keep the Banner Flying, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1125 (1907), 
as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 515 (1908). 
 257 Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2014) (first quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 676 (1984); and then citing Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
 258 U.S. MINT FIN. DEP’T, 50 STATE QUARTERS REPORT: 10 YEARS OF HONORING OUR NATION’S 
HISTORY AND HERITAGE 1, 4. 
 259 Id. at 6; see also 50 States Commemorative Coin Program Act, Pub. L. No. 105-124, § 2(1)(B), 111 
Stat. 2534, 2534 (1997). 
260  U.S. MINT FIN. DEP’T, supra note 258, at 4. 
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The program had substantial public benefits.  The Mint estimated that 
the state commemorative program resulted in a marginal increase in 
production of 16.3 billion quarters over the ten-year program, and a 
marginal increase in revenue of $4.1 billion, which was applied “to help 
finance the national debt.”261  The Mint also reported that the state 
commemorative program had significant education benefits: “The 50 State 
Quarters Program’s benefit to the American public extended beyond 
financial results by increasing knowledge of each state’s history, geography 
and culture.”262  To help the nation’s teachers fulfill the educational promise 
of the program, the Mint launched a special initiative:  
The United States Mint created the [50 State Quarters Program] Education 
Initiative to employ the popular 50 State Quarters Program as a medium to 
teach children about mathematics, geography, social studies and 
history. . . . As of March 2009, approximately 6.1 million 50 States Quarters 
Program lesson plans were downloaded from the United States Mint H.I.P. 
Pocket Change Web site.263 
The Mint concluded that the 50 State Quarters “Program energized the 
Agency’s efforts to provide financial and educational benefits to the Ameri-
can public through the Nation’s coinage, and opened the door for a new 
generation of circulating commemorative coin programs.”264   
Building on that energy, walking through that open door, could be a new 
program of the Mint: the “American Coins Celebrating Our Religious Diver-
sity Program” (the “ACCORD Program”).  Based on the example of the 50 
State Quarters Program, the ACCORD Program would be designed to 
promote knowledge of individual religions and traditions of opinions and beliefs 
on matters of religion, their history and geography, and the rich diversity of the 
national heritage among the youth of the United States.   
How would such a program work?  Although the 50 State Quarters 
Program demonstrated the feasibility of a coinage program involving fifty 
distinct designs, the ACCORD program could be done on a more modest 
scale.  Looking at contemporary survey research reports of our national 
makeup on matters of religious opinion and belief, a threshhold could be set 
in terms of the number of individuals self-identifying with a given survey 
	
 261 Id. at 1 (“The United States Mint estimated it shipped 16.3 billion more coins to the [Federal Re-
serve Bank] than it would have in the absence of the Program.  Consequently, the Agency attributes 
$4.1 billion in revenue and $3.0 billion in seigniorage [revenue net production and distribution 
costs] solely to the 50 State Quarters Program.”); id. at 2 (“The 50 State Quarters Program met the 
financial expectations of the authorizing legislation, generating $8.6 billion in revenue and $6.3 
billion in seigniorage to help finance the national debt.”); id. at  4 (“Higher revenue and seigniorage 
allow the United States Mint to transfer larger sums to the Treasury General Fund, which helps 
finance the national debt.”). 
 262 Id. at 2. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. 
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response.  Any response having numbers at or above the threshhold would 
be qualified to participate in the ACCORD program.  For example, using 
recent findings of the Pew Research Center,265 if one set the percentage 
qualification threshhold at 0.5%, a grouping would have to have almost one 
and a quarter million adherents to qualify.266  Assume the issuance of thirty-
five billion quarters, the same number as in the 50 State Quarters Program, 
and a per capita allocation.267  Using that threshhold, a rich diversity of 
opinions and thoughts on matters of religion would be represented: 
 
Grouping Percentage Number Quarters 
Protestant 46.5 113,925,000 16,726,618,705 
Catholic 20.8 50,960,000 7,482,014,388 
Nothing in Particular 15.8 38,710,000 5,683,453,237 
Agnostic 4.0 9,800,000 1,438,848,921 
Atheist 3.1 7,595,000 1,115,107,914 
Jewish 1.9 4,655,000 683,453,237 
Mormon 1.6 3,920,000 575,539,568 
Muslim 0.9 2,205,000 323,741,007 
Jehovah’s Witness 0.8 1,960,000 287,769,784 
Buddhist 0.7 1,715,000 251,798,561 
Hindu 0.7 1,715,000 251,798,561 
Orthodox Christian 0.5 1,225,000 179,856,115 
Total 97.3 238,385,000 34,999,999,998 
 
A 0.5% threshhold would include 97.3% of adult Americans in the program, 
some 238,385,000 of the estimated 245,000,000, and would not exclude any 
individually identified grouping in the Pew Research study.268 
	
 265 See generally 2015 PEW RESEARCH SURVEY, supra note 244.  
 266 This calculation is based on the Pew Research Center’s estimate that in 2014 the U.S. adult popu-
lation was about 245 million.  Id. at 7 (estimating that the U.S. adult population grew from 227 
million in 2007 to 245 million in 2014). 
 267 U.S. MINT FIN. DEP’T, supra note 258, at 1.  If the coins were allocated equally among the listed 
groupings, each would be allocated slightly more than 2.9 billion coins. 
 268 2015 PEW RESEARCH SURVEY, supra note 244, at 4.  The category “Other Christian” within the 
classification “Christian” accounts for 0.4% and is undefined.  The category “Other world reli-
gions” within the classification “Non-Christian faiths” accounts for 0.3% and includes “Sikhs, 
Baha’is, Taoists, Jains and a variety of other world religions.”  The “Other faiths” within the clas-
sification “Non-Christian faiths” accounts for 1.5% and includes “Unitarians, New Age religions, 
Native American religions and a number of other non-Christian faiths.”  Id. 
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Following the protocols of the 50 State Quarters Program, each qualified 
ACCORD Program participant would be able—through selection processes 
like those employed by the individual states—to adopt a design which would 
then be produced by the Mint.  One can only begin to imagine the interesting 
diversity that the designs might reflect.  For example, the 1.7 million Hindu 
Americans might choose a design for their 251,798,561 quarters with 
Ganesh, the God of wisdom, or Lakshmi, the Goddess of wealth and 
prospertity.  The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, representing 
almost four million Americans, might choose a design for their 575,539,568 
quarters with the Angel Moroni and a quotation from The Doctrine and 
Covenants: “[S]tand ye in holy places, and be not moved . . . .”269   
The largest single group in the Pew study are the almost 114 million 
Protestant Christians.270  One can imagine a consensus emerging that they be 
represented on their 16,726,618,705 quarters by some image of the cross, 
perhaps with the Protestant version of the Ten Commandments.  The fifty-
one million Catholics could select a drawing of the Madonna and child for 
their 7,482,014,388 quarters.  Given their teachings on idolatry, the almost 
two million Jehovah’s Witnesses might choose a design with simply a Biblical 
quotation for their 287,769,784 quarters, such as 1 Timothy 2:5: “For there 
is one God, and one mediator between God and men, a man, Christ Jesus.”271 
The 1.7 million Buddhists might desire a coin with an image of Buddha 
and a reference to the Five Precepts for their 251,798,561 quarters.  The 4.6 
million adult Americans who are Jewish might choose to be represented by 
the image of a menorah and an appropriate Tanakh passage for their 
683,453,237 quarters.  One might hope that agnostics, accounting for almost 
ten million adult Americans, would be represented on their 1,438,848,921 
quarters by the image of American agnostic Robert Ingersoll and the 
quotation: “I do not deny.  I do not know—but I do not believe.”272  The 2.2 
million Muslims might be represented on their 323,741,007 quarters by a 
coin reproducing the shahada: “[T]here is no god but God.  Muhammad is 
the messenger of God.”273  
Some groupings are more difficult.  How, for exemple might the almost 
thirty-nine million adult Americans in the “nothing in particular” category 
choose to be represented on their 5,683,453,237 quarters?  With the 
inscription, “Whatever”?  At almost 16% of the overall adult population, they 
surely could not in fairness be excluded.  God alone knows how the 7.6 million 
atheists would choose to be represented on their 1,115,107,914 quarters.  
	
269 CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS, THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS § 87:8. 
270  2015 PEW RESEARCH SURVEY, supra note 244, at 4. 
271  1 Timothy 2:5 (New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures (2013 Revision)). 
 272 Ingersoll, supra note 146. 
 273  Lloyd Ridgeon, Islam, in MAJOR WORLD RELIGIONS: FROM THEIR ORIGINS TO THE PRESENT 
230, 232 (Lloyd Ridgeon ed., 2003). 
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Of course some groups might wish to aggregate or disaggregate.  One 
can imagine the agnostics, atheists, and “nothing in particular” groups trying 
to negotiate an aggregation of their 56.1 million adults, 22.9 percent of the 
total, for 8,237,410,072 coins.  The outcome would be interesting. 
More likely might be disaggregations, as components of the Protestant 
Christian grouping elected to go their own way.  With some thirty-six million 
mainline Protestants one can imagine a disaggregation along denominational 
lines; the same for the sixty-two million evangelical Protestants. 
However the groupings realigned, the results would be fascinating.  
Certainly one would expect significant collateral benefits to acrue from a 
coinage program celebrating the nation’s diversity of opinions and beliefs on 
matters of religion.  Like the 50 State Quarters Program, the ACCORD 
Program would prove to be financially beneficial and educationally interesting. 
The 50 State Quarters Program saw American school children searching 
for rare state quarters to complete fifty-state collections.  Presumably the 
ACCORD Program would see the next generation of school children 
searcing as assiduously for that elusive Orthodox Christian or Hindu quarter, 
that rare Mormon or Muslim coin. 
Surely the ACCORD Program would benefit the American public by 
increasing knowledge of our history and culture.  One would assume that to 
help the nation’s teachers fulfill the educational promise of the Program, the 
Mint would launch a special initiative to employ the Program as a medium to 
teach children about mathematics, religious studies, social studies, and history. 
Some citizens might be initially uncomfortable with coins that contain 
religious imagery and messaging from a faith tradition other than their own.  
But they would surely come to understand that the drawing of Ganesh, the 
Hindu God of wisdom, on the quarter in their pocket is a patriotic and 
ceremonial reference with no theological impact; that the Madonna and 
child on the coin they use at the car wash has no theological meaning.  They 
would come to see that the image of Buddha and the reference to the Five 
Precepts serve only the secular ceremonial function of formalizing the 
quarter they got as change at the QuickTrip.  They would see the image of 
the Angel Moroni on the quarter they handed to their child as a means of 
fostering patriotism, the quotation from American agnostic Robert Ingersoll 
as a way to express confidence in the future.  Glancing at the quarter with a 
quotation from the Shahada—There is no god but God.  Muhammad is the messenger 
of God.—would assuredly encourage in them the recognition of what is 
worthy of appreciation in society.  They would see these coins as merely 
symbolic of the historical role of religion in our society.  They would see that 
the religious messaging and imagery has a secular, not a religious, purpose.   
Sure they would. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is the choicest compliment that has ever been paid us, and the most gratifying to 
our feelings.  It is simple, direct, gracefully phrased; it always sounds well—In God 
We Trust.  I don’t believe it would sound any better if it were true.  And in a 
measure it is true—half the nation trusts in Him.  That half has decided it.  
—Mark Twain274 
Our history with respect to constitutional challenges to having In God we 
trust on our currency nicely illustrates Freud’s observation that “Where the 
questions of religion are concerned people are guilty of every possible kind of 
insincerity and intellectual misdemeanor.”275  How other than as an insincer-
ity could one characterize the assertion that the motto “has no theological or 
ritualistic impact”?276  Given the history of administrative and legislative ac-
tions concerning the placement of the motto on our currency, how could the 
conclusion that they had a secular legislative purpose be other than an intel-
lectual misdemeanor?   
The problem is the lingering sense that our history on this issue, and on 
a range of related issues involving the religious liberty interests of disfavored 
citizens, evidences more than Freud’s insincerity and intellectual misdemean-
ors.  The history points to a larger problem, a fundamental lack of respect 
for some Americans based on their beliefs on matters of religion. 
In one sense, Twain’s observation is correct.  The issue of whether it is 
appropriate to have In God we trust on our currency has been decided by the 
dominant part of the population.  After all, in 1864, 1908, 1955, and 2007, 
statutes were enacted approving or expanding the placement, and on five 
occasions courts have upheld the constitutionality of the practice.277  But in 
another sense, Twain’s observation is perhaps premature.  For some of us, 
the issue of whether it is appropriate to have In God we trust on our currency 
still waits for a serious, careful, and deliberate judicial analysis under the 
Establishment Clause.  The issue may not have been decided just yet. 
How such an analysis might proceed is suggested by an older case 
	
 274 Mark Twain, Personal Notes of Mark Twain, in ALBERT BIGELOW PAINE, MARK TWAIN’S 
NOTEBOOK 394 (1935).  In 2016, the United States Mint issued two coins honoring Mark Twain.  
Mark Twain Commemorative $1 Silver Coin, U.S. MINT, https://www.usmint.gov/coins/coin-medal-
programs/commemorative-coins/mark-twain-silver (last updated June 1, 2016); Mark Twain Com-
memorative $5 Gold Coin, U.S. MINT, https://www.usmint.gov/coins/coin-medal-programs/com-
memorative-coins/mark-twain-gold (last updated June 1, 2016); see also Mark Twain Commemorative 
Coins, U.S. MINT, https://www.usmint.gov/learn/coin-and-medal-programs/commemorative-
coins/mark-twain (last updated Nov. 3, 2016).  One can but wonder what Twain’s reaction would 
have been to the In God we trust inscriptions on the coins.  
 275 FREUD, supra note 126. 
 276 Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242, 243 (9th Cir. 1970) (citing PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 238). 
 277  See supra Parts I and II, and notes 127–132 and accompanying text.  
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presenting a related question.  In 1980, the Fourth Circuit heard Hall, the 
challenge to North Carolina’s “Motorist’s Prayer.”278  The court found the 
writing to be religious, and while it accepted that the asserted purpose of 
promoting vehicular safety was secular, it observed that “the state cannot 
escape the proscriptions of the Establishment Clause merely by identifying a 
beneficial secular purpose.”279  Rejecting a de minimis exception as to 
“relatively minor encroachments,” the Hall court quoted the Supreme Court 
for the proposition that “[t]he breach of neutrality that is today a trickling 
stream may all too soon become a raging torrent.”280  The court concluded:  
By placing its imprimatur on the particular kind of belief embodied in any 
prayer, the state necessarily offends the sensibilities not only of nonbelievers 
but of devout believers among the citizenry who regard prayer “as a 
necessarily private experience.”  The Establishment Clause is intended to 
protect our society from the threat of political division along religious lines. 
As a moment’s reflection reveals, only a ruthless, absolutist application of 
the principle as it relates to officially composed prayers can insure the 
intended protection.  No de minimis exception is tolerable.281 
The Hall court recognized the impossibility of carving out a de minimis 
exception: “Indeed it could be suggested with considerable support from 
history that there is literally no such thing as an innocuous theological 
statement, if by that is meant one incapable of exciting any significant 
religious divisions within the populace.”282  The Hall court held the North 
Carolina Motorist’s Prayer unconstitutional.283   
How might an analysis along the lines of that in Hall be applied to the 
placement of In God we trust on currency?  The reviewing court could start by 
agreeing with Dean Choper and Professor Tushnet that having the motto on 
currency clearly has a religious, not a secular purpose.  It could reject a de 
minimis exception,284 quoting Hall for the proposition that “[t]he breach of 
neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging 
	
 278 Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 279 Id. at 1020. 
 280 Id. at 1021 (alteration in original) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp.  v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 
225 (1963)). 
 281 Id. (first quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 283–85; then citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 
(1971); and then citing Comm. of Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794–
98 (1972)).  
 282 Id. at 1022.  The court also observed that  
[w]hile the prayer at issue might at first blush seem utterly innocuous, there are doubtless 
many even within the main theological stream of the dominant religious culture of the 
affected populace who are at least made uncomfortable, and perhaps are positively of-
fended, by the sort of narrowly confined intercessory supplication for deity’s private atten-
tion that it represents.  
  Id. at 1022 n.1. 
 283 Id. at 1023.  
 284 Id. at 1021 (“No de minimis exception is tolerable.”). 
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torrent,”285 and the conclusion that “there is literally no such thing as an 
innocuous theological statement, if by that is meant one incapable of exciting 
any significant religious divisions within the populace.”286  The reviewing 
court could affirm the Hall declaration that “[t]he Establishment Clause is 
intended to protect our society from the threat of political division along 
religious lines,” adopt its conclusion that “only a ruthless, absolutist 
application of the principle . . . can insure the intended protection,”287 and 
declare the practice of having In God we trust  on currency unconstitutional. 
But we need not speculate how the Hall court would have analysed 
having In God we trust on our currency.  In dicta, it told us, and the statement 
was a complete deviation from its Motorist’s Prayer analysis: 
References to the Deity in our ceremonies and on our coinage and seals do 
not violate the Establishment Clause because they merely reflect this fact of 
our history [that “[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose 
a Supreme Being”] and no longer have any potentially entangling 
theological significance.288 
What happened to the court that described de minimis exceptions as 
intolerable, that advocated a ruthless, absolutist application of the 
Establishment Clause to protect society from the threat of political division 
along religious lines?  What became of the judges who thought there is no 
such thing as an innocuous theological statement?  At what point did that 
court become comfortable with grandfathering violations of the 
Establishment Clause? 
Using Pfeffer’s insight into how disfavored religious groups may see 
practices the favored religious groups see as “trifling,” consider how the 
dismissive statement about In God we trust from Hall might appear to an 
agnostic or atheist, a Hindu or Wiccan.289  In its analysis of the Motorist’s 
Prayer, the Hall court demonstrated a concern over variations of belief within 
	
 285 Id. at 1021 (alteration in original) (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225). 
 286 Id. at 1022.  
 287 Id. at 1021. 
 288 Id. at 1022–23 (inner alteration in original) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).  
In a footnote, the court asserted:  
In a very real sense they may be treated as “grandfathered” exceptions to the general pro-
hibition against officially composed theological statements.  Present at the very founda-
tions, few in number, fixed and invariable in form, confined in display and utterance to a 
limited set of official occasions and objects, they can safely occupy their own small, unex-
pandable niche in Establishment Clause doctrine.  Their singular quality of being rooted 
in our history and their incapacity to tempt competing or complementary theological for-
mulations by contemporary agencies of government sufficiently cabin them in and distin-
guish them from new, open-form theological expressions published under the aegis of the 
state.  
  Id. at 1023 n.2.  
 289 PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 188 (“[W]hat is ‘trifling’ or de minimis to a dominant sect may be of vital 
importance to a minority sect.”). 
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the “dominant religious culture.”290  But in its dicta about the motto, the Hall 
court evidenced no concern over variations of religious belief between citizens 
disfavored and favored on religious grounds.  By quoting a saccharine and 
ahistorical “fact of our history”—“that ‘[w]e are a religious people whose 
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being’”—the Hall court ignored the 
Establishment Clause and demeaned those disfavored on the basis of their 
religious beliefs.291  And when it declared that statements such as In God we 
trust “no longer have any potentially entangling theological significance,” it 
apparently presumed to instruct the disfavored among us on what they could 
think theologically significant.292  The Hall court dicta would have denied 
those outside the favored religious culture the same status and respect it 
accorded those within it. 
The same dismissive and disrespectful treatment is found in the de minimis, 
ceremonial deism, and de facto establishment analyses.  The notion that a de 
minimis exception is justified because the number of instances of favorable 
governmental recognition of religion “is so great and they are so pervasive that 
they go unnoticed until attention is drawn to them” is clearly drawn from the 
perspective of those with favored religious beliefs.293  It seems reasonable to 
imagine that violations of the Establishment Clause that  are so common as to 
be invisible to the favored may be especially apparent and hurtful to the 
disfavored.  Similarly, a disfavored citizen might be expected to view differently 
than a favored citizen whether it is reasonable to view as conveying 
governmental approval of religious belief an Establishment Clause violation 
that is broadly committed and has a long history, the kind that some analysts 
would excuse as ceremonial deism.294  A disfavored citizen might also be 
expected to view differently practices that would otherwise violate the 
Establishment Clause but which the de facto establishment analysis assures us 
are “relatively slight,”295 or “bland.”296  The observation that “[s]ome aspects 
of the de facto establishment, such as the . . . placement of ‘In God We Trust’ 
on the currency, have become drained of religious significance in the minds of 
many Americans”297 simply suggests that for other Americans—those disfavored 
	
 290 Hall, 630 F.2d at 1022 n.1 (“While the prayer at issue might at first blush seem utterly innocuous, 
there are doubtless many even within the main theological stream of the dominant religious culture 
of the affected populace who are at least made uncomfortable, and perhaps are positively offended, 
by the sort of narrowly confined intercessory supplication for deity’s private attention that it repre-
sents.”). 
 291 Id. at 1022–23 (alteration in original) (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313).   
 292 Id. at 1023. 
 293 PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 187 (quoting Sutherland, supra note 200, at 1343). 
 294 Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 
U.S. 573, 625 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)) (noting 
“historical usage and ubiquity”).   
 295  Tushnet, supra note 206, at 1005. 
 296  Koppelman, supra note 152, at 152. 
 297  Id. at 153 (emphasis added). 
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on the basis of religious belief—the challenged practices have not become 
drained of religious significance.  
Beyond Freud’s insincerities and intellectual misdemeanors, the serious 
problem with having In God we trust on our currency, and the unserious, care-
less, and cursory judicial analysis it has been given, is the disrespect it evidences 
toward the sincerely held beliefs on matters of religion of some of our fellow 
citizens, and thus by extension disrespect toward the citizens themselves.   
Of course, the placement of In God we trust on our currency is just one 
example of a larger pattern of statutes, rules, and governmental actions that 
evidence disrespect towards citizens with disfavored religious beliefs.  A few 
examples help to remind us that these are not only theoretical problems. 
“In the winter of 2014, Rawda Musaitef was involved in a custody dispute 
with her former husband . . . in a Philadelphia family court.”298  When called 
to testify, Rawda, a Muslim, requested to be sworn using a Quran instead of 
a Bible.  Her request was refused299 because the Pennsylvania statute pro-
vides that: “Every witness, before giving any testimony shall take an oath in 
the usual or common form, by laying the hand upon an open copy of the 
Holy Bible . . . .”300 
In the fall of 2009, Cecil Bothwell, an atheist, was running to be a member 
of the Asheville city council.301  His candidacy was challenged by H.K. Edger-
ton, citing a provision of the North Carolina constitution which bars from 
office “any person who shall deny the being of Almighty God.”302  Bothwell 
	
 298 Allan W. Vestal, Fixing Witness Oaths: Shall We Retire the Rewarder of Truth and Avenger of Falsehood?, 27 
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 453 (2016). 
 299  Id. at 456. 
 300 Id. at 454 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5901(a) (1978)).  Pennsylvania does allow an alternative 
method to take a religious oath: “or by lifting up the right hand and pronouncing or assenting to 
the following words: ‘I, A. B., do swear by Almighty God, the searcher of all hearts, that I will 
____________________, and that as I shall answer to God at the last great day.’”  Id. (quoting 42 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 5901(a)).  Presumably Rawda Musaitef had the same objections to a religious 
oath swearing to the Christian God.  Pennsylvania also provides for a non-religious affirmation, id. 
(citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5901(b)), which was available to Rawda Musaitef but which evidently 
she deemed an inadequate substitute for a religious oath administered using the Quran, the book 
of her faith tradition. 
 301 Allan W. Vestal, The Lingering Bigotry of State Constitution Religious Tests, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIG., 
GENDER & CLASS 55, 58–59 (2015) [hereinafter Vestal, Lingering Bigotry]; see also David Zucchino, 
Councilman Under Fire for Atheism, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2009), http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/2009/dec/20/nation/la-na-hometown-asheville20-2009dec20 (reporting others 
describing Bothwell as an “atheist,” a “post-theist,” “Satan’s helper,” and a “radical extremist”). 
 302 Vestal, Lingering Bigotry, supra note 301, at 58 (quoting N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 8).  Today, eight 
states—Arkansas, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennes-
see, and Texas—have religious tests for public office; provisions which are, of course, unconstitu-
tional.  Id. at 62. 
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refused to drop out of the race.  He won his election and sits on the Asheville 
city council today.303 
In the summer of 2014, an unidentified Air Force Technical Sergeant 
wanted to reenlist.304  A non-believer, he struck the words “so help me God” 
from the official reenlistment form.  The Air Force refused to let him reenlist 
without assenting to the religious oath.305  The Technical Sergeant chal-
lenged the Air Force’s position, and amid public controversy, the govern-
ment backed down.306 
In the winter of 2006, the first Muslim elected to Congress, Keith Ellison 
of Minnesota’s Fifth Congressional District, was the focus of controversy 
when he announced that he would take the symbolic oath of office using a 
Quran rather than a Bible.307  One prominent political commentator said 
that the new Representative should be required to take the oath on the Bible 
because to allow him to be sworn on the Quran would do “more damage to 
the unity of America and to the value system that has formed this country 
than the terrorists of 9-11.”308  Congressman Ellison elected to do the cere-
mony holding a Quran that had been owned by Thomas Jefferson “because 
it showed that a visionary like Jefferson believed that wisdom could be 
gleaned from many sources.”309 
Viewed in one way, these cases are not as extreme as they might be.  
Rawda Musaitef was not being told she could not testify, or even that she had 
	
 303  Meet City Council, CITY OF ASHEVILLE, http://www.ashevillenc.gov/council/meet_city_coun 
cil.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).  Recently, however, Bothwell narrowly lost in the primary, 
finishing in seventh where a sixth-place finish was required to advance to the general election.  Matt 
Bush, Asheville Primary Results—Bothwell Ousted, Other Incumbents Advance, BLUE RIDGE PUB. RADIO 
(Oct. 10, 2017), http://bpr.org/post/asheville-primary-results-bothwell-ousted-other-incumbents-
advance. 
 304  Vestal, Lingering Bigotry, supra note 301, at 95–96. 
 305 Id. at 96 (“The airman was told his only options were to sign the religious oath section of the contract 
without adjustment and recite an oath concluding with ‘so help me God,’ or leave the Air 
Force . . . .”  (alteration in original) (quoting Stephen Losey, Group: Airman Denied Reenlistment for Re-
fusing to Say ‘So Help Me God,’ AIR FORCE TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://www.airfor-
cetimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2014/09/04/group-airman-denied-reenlistment-for-re-
fusing-to-say-so-help-me-god/)). 
 306 Id. at 96–97.  The Air Force rule was clearly unconstitutional, given the Article VI § 3 provision 
that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under 
the United States.” 
 307 Allan W. Vestal, Regarding Oaths of Office, 37 PACE L. REV. 292, 292 (2016).   
 308 Id. at 293 (quoting Dennis Prager, America, Not Keith Ellison, Decides What Book a Congressman Takes His 
Oath on, TOWNHALL (Nov. 28, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://townhall.com/columnists/dennis-
prager/2006/11/28/america,-not-keith-ellison,-decides-what-book-a-congressman-takes-his-oath 
-on-n792991).   
 309 Id. (quoting Frederic J. Frommer, Ellison Uses Thomas Jefferson’s Quran, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2007, 
7:32 AM)).   
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to swear a Christian oath in order to testify.310  She could have testified using 
a non-religious affirmation.  But to use a religious oath, she would have had 
to use a Christian oath.  Cecil Bothwell was not being told he could not live 
in Asheville, merely that to serve as an elected official of his hometown he 
had to be a Christian.  The unidentified Technical Sergeant was not being 
told he could not serve in the Air Force, only that to do so he had to swear 
an oath contrary to his religious beliefs.  Congressman Ellison was not being 
told he could not serve in Congress, merely that to do so he ought to swear 
his oath of office on the Bible, a religious text outside his faith tradition. 
In each case, the member of the disfavored religious group was being tol-
erated but not respected.  And toleration is the wrong concept when all are 
equally free.  Baptist abolitionist and religious liberty advocate John Leland 
framed the argument in 1790: “[T]he very idea of toleration is despicable; it 
supposes that some have a pre-eminence above the rest, to grant indulgence; 
whereas, all should be equally free, Jews, Turks, Pagans and Christians.”311  
Toleration is the wrong concept when dealing with citizens who are free to 
profess as they wish on matters of religious belief; as Andrew Dunlap argued 
in 1834 when defending Abner Kneeland: “This is the boasted land of 
toleration.  No, gentlemen, that is not the proper word, for who shall presume 
to tolerate another, when the latter has an undeniable right to enjoy and 
maintain his own opinions?”312 
At a time when our nation is tense with the cross-cutting cleavages of 
modernity, when America is evolving toward a strikingly diverse future on 
matters of religion, we would be well to remember that fidelity to the 
constitutional guarantee of religious liberty requires more than toleration—
it reqires genuine respect for fellow citizens whose religious beliefs differ from 
our own.  If we are to be a nation that is enhanced, and not fractured, by our 
religious diversity, then we must truly respect one another on matters of 
religion.  It will not be enough that the government stops disfavoring some 
citizens on the basis of their religious beliefs—each of us must be respectful 
in our own hearts—but that the government do so is a necessary predicate. 
	
 310 Although there was a time when she could have been excluded from testifying because of her reli-
gious beliefs.  Vestal, Lingering Bigotry, supra note 301, at 71.  Remarkably, even today, two states—
Arkansas and Maryland—have religious tests for testimonial competency; provisions which are, of 
course, unconstitutional.  Id. at 71 & app. C. 
 311 DICKSON D. BRUCE, JR., EARNESTLY CONTENDING: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND PLURALISM IN 
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 124 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting John Leland, The Excess of Civil 
Power Exploded, in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND, INCLUDING SOME EVENTS 
IN HIS LIFE 117, 118 (L. F. Greene ed., Arno Press, Inc., reprt. ed. 1969)) (1845) 
 312 ANDREW DUNLAP, A SPEECH DELIVERED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF 
BOSTON IN DEFENSE OF ABNER KNEELAND ON AN INDICTMENT FOR BLASPHEMY 17 (1834). 
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When Reverend Watkinson wrote Treasury Secretary Chase during the 
Rebellion to propose adding “the recognition of the Almighty God in some form 
on our coins,” he made a specific proposal for how the coins should be altered: 
What I propose is that instead of the goddess of liberty we shall have next 
inside the 13 stars a ring inscribed with the words “perpetual union;” within 
the ring the all-seeing eye, crowned with a halo; beneath this eye the 
American flag, bearing in its fields stars equal to the number of the States 
united; in the folds of the bars the words “God, liberty, law.”313 
It is ironic that Reverend Watkinson wanted to banish the Goddess of 
Liberty to make room for recognition of the Christian God.  Surely the time 
has come to remove the motto and recognize on our currency that the religious 
liberty interests of all our citizens have a claim prior to that of any religion.  
	
 313 1896 REPORT, supra note 9, at 260.  
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APPENDIX A.   
NOVEMBER 13, 1861 LETTER FROM REVEREND MARK R. WATKINSON 
TO TREASURY SECRETARY SALMON P. CHASE.314 
RIDLEYVILLE, PA., November 13, 1861. 
DEAR SIR: You are about to submit your annual report to the Congress 
respecting the affairs of the national finances. 
One fact touching our currency has hitherto been seriously overlooked.  
I mean the recognition of the Almighty God in some form on our coins. 
You are probably a Christian.  What if our Republic were now shattered 
beyond reconstruction?  Would not the antiquaries of succeeding centuries 
rightly reason from our past that we were a heathen nation?  What I propose 
is that instead of the goddess of liberty we shall have next inside the 13 stars 
a ring inscribed with the words “perpetual union;” within the ring the all-
seeing eye, crowned with a halo; beneath this eye the American flag, bearing 
in its field stars equal to the number of the States united; in the folds of the 
bars the words “God, liberty, law.” 
This would make a beautiful coin, to which no possible citizen could ob-
ject.  This would relieve us from the ignominy of heathenism.  This would 
place us openly under the Divine protection we have personally claimed.  
From my heart I have felt our national shame in disowning God as not the 
least of our present national disasters. 
To you first I address a subject that must be agitated. 
  M.R. WATKINSON, 
  Minister of the Gospel. 
Hon. S. P. Chase, 
Secretary of the Treasury 
  
	
 314 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON 
THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR THE YEAR 1896, H.R. DOC. NO. 54-8, at 260 (1897); History of 
“In God We Trust,” U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/about/educa-
tion/pages/in-god-we-trust.aspx.  
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APPENDIX B.   
NOVEMBER 20, 1861 LETTER FROM TREASURY SECRETARY SALMON P. 
CHASE TO JAMES POLLOCK, DIRECTOR OF THE MINT.315 
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, November 20, 1861. 
DEAR SIR: No nation can be strong except in the strength of God, or safe 
except in His defense.  The trust of our people in God should be declared on 
our national coins. 
You will cause a device to be prepared without unnecessary delay with a 
motto expressing in the fewest and tersest words possible this national recog-
nition. 
Yours, truly, 
  S. P. CHASE. 
   
James Pollock, Esq., 
Director of the Mint, Philadelphia, Pa.  
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THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR THE YEAR 1896, H.R. DOC. NO. 54-8, at 261 (1897); History of 
“In God We Trust,” U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/about/educa-
tion/pages/in-god-we-trust.aspx.  
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APPENDIX C. 
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT THEODORE ROOSEVELT.316 
When the question of the new coinage came up we looked into the law 
and found there was no warrant therein for putting “In God We Trust” on 
the coins.  As the custom, although without legal warrant, had grown up, 
however, I might have felt at liberty to keep the inscription had I approved 
of its being on the coinage.  But as I did not approve of it I did not direct that 
it should again be put on.  Of course the matter of the law is absolutely in the 
hands of Congress, and any direction of the Congress in the matter will be 
immediately obeyed.  At present, as I have said, there is no warrant in law 
for the inscription. 
My own feeling in the matter is due to my very firm conviction that to 
put such a motto on coins, or to use it in any kindred manner, not only does 
no good, but does positive harm, and is in effect irreverence, which comes 
dangerously close to sacrilege.  A beautiful and solemn sentence such as the 
one in question should be treated and uttered only with that fine reverence 
which necessarily implies a certain exaltation of spirit. 
Any use which tends to cheapen it, and, above all, any use which tends to 
secure its being treated in a spirit of levity, is from every standpoint profoundly 
to be regretted.  It is a motto which is, indeed, well to have inscribed on our 
great National monuments, in our temples of justice, in our legislative halls, 
and in buildings such as those at West Point and Annapolis – in short, wherever 
it will tend to arouse and inspire a lofty emotion in those who look thereon. 
But it seems to me eminently unwise to cheapen such a motto by use on 
coins, just as it would be to cheapen it by use on postage stamps or in adver-
tisements.  As regards its use on the coinage, we have actual experience by 
which to go.  In all my life I have never heard any human being speak rev-
erently of this motto on the coins or show any signs of its having appealed to 
any high emotion in him, but I have literally, hundreds of times heard it used 
as an occasion of an incitement to the sneering ridicule which is, above all 
things, undesirable that so beautiful and exalted a phrase should excite. 
For example, throughout the long contest extending over several decades 
on the free coinage question, the existence of this motto on the coins was a 
constant source of jest and ridicule, and this was unavoidable.  Every one 
must remember the innumerable cartoons and articles based on phrases like 
“In God we trust for the 8 cents,” “In God we trust for the short weight,” “In 
God we trust for the 37 cents we do not pay,” and so forth and so forth. 
	
 316 Roosevelt Dropped ‘In God We Trust’: President Says Such a Motto on Coin Is Irreverence, Close to Sacrilege, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1907, at 1, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9406E2D810-
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Surely, I am well within bounds when I say that a use of the phrase which 
invites constant levity of this type is most undesirable.  If Congress alters the 
law and directs me to replace on the coins the sentence in question, the di-
rection will be immediately put into effect, but I very earnestly trust that the 
religious sentiment of the country, the spirit of reverence in the country, will 
prevent any such action being taken. 
  Theodore Roosevelt  
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